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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ATTORNEY FACT-FINDING, ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING AND
THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW

ROBERT RUBINSON*

INTRODUCTION
A classic question in legal ethics is whether it is “proper to put a witness
on the stand when you know he will commit perjury.”1 Many commentators
have examined this question and proposed a range of resolutions, some of
which have been adopted in codes of ethics.2
Consider, however, what this question does not ask. The propriety of
putting “a witness on the stand when you know he will commit perjury”
assumes the facts that bring the question into play, namely, that a client is

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the comments of Barbara A. Babb, Michele E. Gilman, Steven Grossman, Cheri
Wyron Levin, Peter Margulies, Jane C. Murphy and Ngai Pindell; the research assistance of Sara
R. Litzky and Nicole J. Harrell; and the support of the University of Baltimore Foundation and
the Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics. The author also especially thanks Randi E.
Schwartz for her insights and assistance.
1. Monroe Freedman, Professional Responsibility of Criminal Defense Lawyers: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1475 (1966) [hereinafter Freedman, Three
Hardest Questions]. See also MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 27-42 (1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS]. This question “is now
standard fare in the curriculum of every law school.” Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 352 (1994).
2. Monroe Freedman concluded that criminal defense attorneys must put a “perjurious
witness on the stand without explicit or implicit disclosure” of the truth to judge or jury,
Freedman, Three Hardest Questions, supra note 1, at 1477-78, although he has since modified his
position. Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered
Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939, 1953 (1988) (noting that a lawyer should seek to withdraw if
a client insists on perjured testimony). However, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
mandate that a lawyer “take reasonable remedial measures”—including possible disclosure of
confidential information—if the lawyer “has offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1999). See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157 (1986) (attorney’s disclosure of client confidences because of threatened client perjury would
not violate Sixth Amendment right to counsel). For summaries of approaches and conclusions
about this dilemma, see generally Silver, supra note 1, and DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 197-201 (1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE].
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about to commit perjury. Like a medieval morality play, the character of
“client” embodies only a single quality, that of “perjurer.”
This submersion of facts in the “client perjury problem” typifies “ethics
discourse”—the generalized way that scholars, teachers and professional
organizations approach legal ethics. Facts are almost always skeletal and
assumed in ethics discourse—an analytic move I call “fact formalism.”
Examples of fact formalism in ethics discourse are legion. For example,
two pervasive descriptions of ethical decision-making3 are that attorneys must
interpret rules “given the particularities of the situation”4 or “considering the
relevant circumstances.”5 The passive voice of “given” is telling: it is unclear
who or what is “giving” the “particularities,” and, indeed, it is rare even to
conceive of this as a question worth asking. Similarly, the act of “considering
circumstances” slips by unexamined, and thereby is implicitly a process that is
reflexive or uninteresting. These formulations and their variants, while
nodding to the importance of “particularities” or “circumstances,” view the
particular as setting the stage for the main event—exploring the choice and
interpretation of rules.6
Another demonstration of fact formalism in ethics discourse is the
prevalence of “fact hypotheticals.” By supplying determinate facts, fact
hypotheticals define away fact-finding as a matter for independent study.7
Hypotheticals constitute what Clifford Geertz has called “radically thinned
descriptions,”8 and such “radical thinning” fails to reflect the complexities and
ambiguities of fact-finding in practice. Even attempts to move beyond fact
hypotheticals tend to assimilate the prevailing rules-focus of ethics discourse:

3. I use “ethical decision-making” to refer to how attorneys approach ethics in practice.
The distinction between “ethics discourse” and “ethical decision-making” is critical because, as I
will demonstrate in detail, ethics discourse fails to reflect ethical decision-making as it occurs in
the field. See infra text accompanying notes 22-190.
4. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 39 (1995) (emphasis added). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 75, 114
(1994) (noting that in discussing the interplay of rules and the “ethic of care,” a goal is to explore
how “to apply them to particular situations”).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’
ETHICS 9 (1998) (arguing that attorneys should “take those actions that, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice”) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE].
6. Indeed, the legitimacy of ethics as a discipline worthy of serious study has been largely
due to its growth in “doctrinal complexity.” Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal
Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 723-24 (1988).
7. For other critiques of fact hypotheticals in ethics discourse, see infra text accompanying
notes 70-71, 86-90.
8. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 16 (1973).
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although there is burgeoning scholarship on teaching ethics “in context”9
through such techniques as the “pervasive method,”10 simulations,11 and
clinics,12 these approaches are often viewed primarily as an effective means for
teaching rules.13
These tendencies reflect the unspoken premise of fact formalism: the
analysis, interpretation, and choice of rules, whether embodied in written ethics
codes or drawn from principles of morality or justice, form the core of what
legal ethics should be.14 Although to be sure some commentators have
9. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 357 (1998); Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A
New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (1996). See also David B.
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 515-23 (1990) (arguing that
“[c]ontext must replace universality as the touchstone of system design” and positing “five
contextual categories” to guide the future development of ethical rules). I discuss this “contextual
turn” in more detail infra text accompanying notes 35-46.
10. The “pervasive method” seeks to teach legal ethics across the law school curriculum as
opposed to in a single course. The leading proponent of this method is Deborah L. Rhode. See
DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (2d
ed. 1998); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992)
[hereinafter Rhode, Pervasive Method].
11. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through Simulation: The
Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professionalism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37
(1995); Jonathan M. Freiman, Steps Toward a Pedagogy of Improvisation in Legal Ethics, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1279 (1998); Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development through
Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995).
12. See generally Luban & Millemann, supra note 4; Joan L. O’Sullivan et al., Ethical
Decisionmaking and Ethics Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CLINICAL. L. REV. 109
(1996); Robert A. Solomon, Teaching Morality, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 507 (1992); Steven H.
Leleiko, Love, Professional Responsibility, the Rule of Law, and Clinical Legal Education, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 641 (1980).
13. For example, Bruce Green, in arguing for the adoption of ethics courses grounded in
defined subject areas, says that such “context matters” because: 1) “particular rules of
professional conduct and issues of professional conduct may or may not be very significant” in a
given context; 2) “particular aspects of the other ‘law of lawyering’ may or may not be very
significant”; 3) “particular regulatory mechanisms may or may not be very significant”; 4)
“ethical rules and laws . . . may have different meanings depending on the context.” Green, supra
note 9, at 382-84. See also Daly, supra note 9, at 194 (“contextual courses” on professional
responsibility help students to “learn the rules governing lawyers’ conduct” and “debate the
underlying public policies”).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 22-34. Indeed, proposals for modification of existing
ethics codes and proposals for entirely new ethics codes are proliferating. See James Rodgers,
Ethics in 2000 and Beyond: Profession Hustles To Keep Apace of Changing Standards, 85
A.B.A. J. 96 (1999) (citing the explosion of evolving ethical standards and rules reflecting
changes in practice of law). For example, the federal courts will likely adopt uniform ethics rules
(66 U.S.L.W. 2549 (1998)) and the ABA is undertaking a full-scale revision of the Model Rules
called “Ethics 2000.” See Ethics 2000 Commission, May 2001 Report to the House of Delegates;
American Bar Association, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct (November 2000). Ethics codes are being proposed and adopted in many areas,
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attacked rules as not meaningfully influencing ethical conduct,15 as (despite
their rhetoric) a mechanism that primarily promotes professional self-interest,16
or as sinking to the “lowest common denominator” of ethical obligation,17 the
primacy of rules as the preeminent object of inquiry in ethics discourse is
rarely in question.
The problem with this emphasis is that while doctrinal issues are
undoubtedly significant, the “given” facts of the prevailing methodology of
legal ethics obscure a dimension of ethical decision-making that is of
incalculable importance and of extraordinary richness and complexity.18 To
illustrate this point, assume that you represent a client named Ms. Cooper who
has applied for disability benefits. Ms. Cooper has mental and physical
impairments that are corroborated by medical records. The medical records
also note at various points that the client has had a history of substance abuse.
You know that impairments caused by continued or past substance abuse are
virtually fatal to any disability claim.19

including rules governing non-lawyer claimant representatives in proceedings before the Social
Security Administration (67 U.S.L.W. 2074 (1998)), a code governing legal commentators (A
Proposed Code of Ethics for Legal Commentators: A Symposium, 50 MERCER L. REV. 671
(1991)), and a code of ethics governing notaries public. Code of Ethics for Notary Publics—The
Notary Public Code of Public Responsibility, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 887 (1999). Proposals
that would open up practice to nonlawyers still contemplate the imposition of ethical codes.
Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology
Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1270 (1995).
Perhaps a culmination of this trend is the recent publication of the American Law Institute’s
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). See L. Ray Patterson, An Essay on Teaching Professional
Responsibility, 19 N. ILL. L. REV. 333, 338 (1999) (praising ALI’s RESTATEMENT as providing a
“unified approach” to ethical, procedural, and malpractice rules, and such an “integrated body of
rules” should form the basis for course on Professional Responsibility). See also PIERRE
SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 26 (1998) (discussing a trend towards “propositional
systematizations” in American law since the late nineteenth century).
15. See, e.g., John Ladd, The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and
Moral Confusion, in R. CHALK ET AL., PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ACTIVITIES IN THE SCIENTIFIC
AND ENGINEERING SOCIETIES 154 (1980); Richard Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 641-52 (1981).
16. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 48 (1986) (alluding to the
criticism of professional codes of ethics as “the products of grasping and selfish motivations,
based on anticompetitive or class-based animus”); Abel, supra note 15, at 654 (“ethical rules
contribute to market control” by lawyers); SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 196
(professional associations which enact ethical norms “are both historically and structurally
disposed toward more than occasional narrow self-interest”).
17. Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 46 (2000).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 119-90.
19. Termination and denial of benefits to claimants suffering from alcoholism and drug
abuse was the result of amendments to the Social Security Act passed by Congress in 1996.
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During a client interview, the following exchange takes place:
You:
Can you tell me about when your symptoms began?
Ms. Cooper: Well, they started about ten years ago, after I got hit by a car.
I started feeling dizzy after that, and the headaches started. I
couldn’t work because of those problems, so I got depressed.
I just didn’t know what to do with myself.
You:
I know this might be uncomfortable for you to talk about,
but your records mention something about substance abuse.
Ms. Cooper: Oh, yes, I took some drugs back then. I didn’t know what
else to do.
You:
Do you take drugs now?
Ms. Cooper: Well, that’s over now. I know that they don’t solve any
problems.
You:
I’m sorry I need to go into this, but do you take drugs at all
now?
Ms. Cooper: Oh, hardly ever. It’s been some time now.
You press Ms. Cooper further about her drug use, but you fear that additional
inquiry might strain the relationship that you have spent a great deal of time
fostering with her. Ms. Cooper’s responses to your inquiries vary from “I
don’t do drugs anymore” to “I might smoke a joint on the odd social occasion.”
Her general vagueness and inconsistency lead you to believe that she might be
lying. But, then again, there is evidence to suggest that she suffers from
mental impairments, and her inconsistency on this point might be the result of
these impairments, or it might be the uncertainty that afflicts everyone about
the timing of past behavior. You are unsure what to conclude.
At the hearing on her claim, you expect that the Administrative Law Judge
will ask about the evidence of substance abuse, so you ask Mrs. Cooper about
it yourself instead during direct examination. Her response: “Oh, I haven’t
done drugs for some time.”
This brief description of a narrow slice of attorney/client interactions is
itself “radically thinned,” for it omits an enormous amount of verbal and nonverbal communication between attorney and client. You also do not know who
“you” are—the nature of your practice, the amount of time you have to devote
to this case, feelings of trust and loyalty you might feel towards Ms. Cooper or

Contract with America Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 105(a)(1), 110 Stat. 847
(1996). Recent studies showing that these actions have caused homelessness and an inability to
afford rehabilitation services may lead Congress to reexamine the issue and, perhaps, increase
social support services available to these individuals. Study Tracks What Happened To Disabled
People Who Were Eliminated From SSI in 1996 (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 15,
1999).
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other clients, as well as many other details that might influence your
Nevertheless, even this “thin”
interpretation of the circumstances.20
description does demonstrate that the issues of fact facing you—whether or not
you construe the situation as one in which perjury has taken place—precede
the issue of how to cure client perjury. This predicate question involves the
construction and interpretation of facts, and this critical dimension of ethical
decision-making takes place within the attorney/client relationship. This is no
easy task; indeed, “[t]he difficult ethical problem . . . is not . . . what the rules
say but whether the factual conditions have arisen that call the rule into
question.”21
This Article confronts this largely invisible “difficult ethical problem” by
exploring the significance, challenges, and complexities of fact-finding in
ethical decision-making. In the first section, I investigate how and why ethics
discourse repeatedly takes facts for granted. In so doing, I explore the
astonishing pervasiveness of unreflective views of facts. Even the most
sophisticated and influential scholars working the field today—William H.
Simon and David Luban—remain fact formalists.
The second section focuses on the processes of fact-finding in ethical
decision-making. The factual dimension of ethical decision-making is critical
to the decision-making process and can be subjected to rigorous and systematic
study. In approaching this study, I discuss how the methodology of factinvestigation and fact-finding has challenges and characteristics that are
distinct from the more familiar methodology of interpreting rules. For
example, constructing “what happened” or “what will happen” entails the
assimilation and interpretation of many sources of information, including the
motivations and ambivalence of clients. Moreover, the interpretation of facts
is an interactive process that happens over time and is subject to myriad
influences, both situational and psychological.
In the final section, I investigate how ethics scholarship and pedagogy
should embrace a more reflective, sophisticated vision of ethics by recognizing
issues of fact as crucial to ethical decision-making. I propose a fresh scholarly
program that focuses on the processes of fact-finding by drawing upon ideas
from psychology and cognitive science. I also offer a range of techniques that
encourage instructors and students to grapple with fact-finding and fact
investigation as a central component of legal ethics.

20. For a description of these potential influences, see infra text accompanying notes 16786.
21. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and Professional Ethics, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
133, 139 (1992).
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I. FACTS AND CONVENTIONAL MODELS OF ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING
Ethics discourse has, with remarkable thoroughness and consistency,
submerged the role that fact-finding plays in ethical decision-making. In this
section I explore in detail how ethics discourse has approached and continues
to approach fact-finding, and I investigate why this approach has prevailed for
so long.
A.

The Formalist Model of Ethical Decision-Making

The conventional methodology of law assumes a fundamental distinction
between law and fact.22 While I will subsequently argue that an overly sharp
delineation between fact and law is simplistic,23 this distinction is so deeply
embedded in the Anglo-American conception of “law” that legal discourse or
the practice of law is inconceivable without it.24
Nevertheless, there are many ways to conceptualize the nature of “law,”
“fact,” and the interactions between the two. The most rigid and orthodox
approach is called “formalism.” “Formalism” typically refers to a style of
legal reasoning that mechanically applies a determinate rule to a determinate
set of facts.25 The mechanistic and determinate flavor of formalism is a
powerful vestige from the Enlightenment, which held that it is a meaningful

22. See infra text accompanying notes 25-34.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 156-66.
24. See Edward I. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 521, 543
(arguing that while legal scholarship “emerge[s] from our system of pre-empirical beliefs,” it
embodies “ways of speaking about things that are important to us” and is therefore
“meaningful”). This is not to say that the law/fact distinction is some universal characteristic of
“law.” To the contrary, systems of law in other cultures do not necessarily conceptualize
adjudication in the same way. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS
IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 214, 222 (1983) (contrasting “the Western polarization of
applicable law and pertinent fact” to Islamic, Indic and Malaysian notions of law as
“interconnections between norms and happenings”); Andrew Huxley, The Golden Yoke, Silken
Text, 106 YALE L.J. 1885, 1911 (1997) (in Tibetan Buddhist law, “parties, judges, and
conciliators engaged in factoring, viewed each case as unique, did not cite previous legal
situations as precedents, and therefore did not elaborate precedential chains of legal rules based
on cases”).
25. See Lynn M. Lopucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyer’s Heads,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1498-99 (1996) (formalism is the application of “the law laid down by
legislatures and appellate courts to the facts of cases” in order to “generate answers”); Robert
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 (1983) (defining
formalism as “belief in the availability of a deductive or quasi-deductive method capable of
giving determinate solutions to particular problems of legal choice”); Margaret J. Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 793 (1989) (“‘Formalism’ is the view that
there exists a mind-independent reality consisting of certain first principles either of fact or
value”).
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enterprise to “get a reliable fix on the world, a world that is, as it were,
assumed to be immutable and, as it were, ‘there to be observed.’”26
While numerous critical theories of jurisprudence have challenged
formalist assumptions for over a century27 and self-proclaimed formalists—
particularly in academia—are rare,28 legal ethics, as a relative newcomer to the
scene as a distinct academic discipline, has tended to retain more formalist
methodology than other disciplines within law.29 As manifested in ethics
discourse, the mechanics of formalism are easy to describe:
Step One:
The facts are x.
Step Two:
The legal rule is y.
Step Three: x when applied to y yields result z.30

26. Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1 (1991).
In pursuing this goal, rationalists “looked inward to the powers of mind itself for the principles of
right reason” while empiricists “concentrated on the mind’s interplay with an external world of
nature, hoping to find the key in the association of sensations and ideas.” Id. The notion of the
world as “immutable”—a submersion of the impact of time and change—is an especially critical
dimension of ethics discourse. See infra text accompanying notes 72, 106-08.
27. An early and famous example is Oliver Wendell Holmes’ essay The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). A particularly influential critique of formalism has been the work of
Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). Dworkin’s work has
also had notable influence on leading theorists on legal ethics, especially William Simon. See,
e.g., SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 247. For overviews of other critical stances
towards jurisprudential formalism, see generally THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990), and Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40
B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1070-86 (1999) (summarizing attacks on formalism in the “Holmesian
century”).
28. See Susan Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33, 36-37
(1996) (“formalism . . . no longer dominate[s] legal culture in these postmodern times”); Lopucki,
supra note 25, at 1498-99 (noting widespread “contempt” for formalism in law schools). Perhaps
the most prominent figure currently espousing conventional formalism is Antonin Scalia. See
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1988).
29. William Simon has noted that critiques of formalism have had less influence on
conceptions of ethical decision-making than on judicial decision-making. SIMON, PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 10.
30. For comparable analyses, see Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism
Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419,
421 (1992) (describing “pure formalists” as viewing adjudication as “a giant syllogism machine”
with a determinate rule as the major premise, “objectively true, preexisting facts” as the minor
premise, with a “conclusion that takes care of itself as a matter of logic”), and Paul Tremblay, The
New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 499 (1999) (referring to “conventional” ideas of
moral theory in which “[t]heory produces the major premise within a syllogism; the facts of a
given case serve as the minor premise; and the syllogism effects the answer”).
Far from being unique to law or legal ethics, this formalist process is the basis of what
has been called the “Moral Law Folk Theory”—a deeply-embedded Western assumption about
how to make moral decisions. MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF
COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS 7 (1993). This theory holds that “[m]oral reasoning is . . .
principally a matter of getting the correct description of the situation [step one], determining
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Step Two—choosing the proper legal rule or the proper interpretation of a
legal rule—attracts the lion’s share of attention in ethics discourse.31 Step
One—the fact-finding step—is predefined and merely a means to an end: the
critical question is which rule or rules should apply to a given set of facts.32
Once Step Two is established, Step Three is a mechanical exercise of applying
“the facts” to the proper rule or interpretation of the rule to produce a single
“right” result or, if the rule is discretionary, a choice of “right” results.
For example, in the client perjury problem, the question is whether it is
“proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will commit
perjury.”33 Step One is easy: you have a client who will lie on the stand. The
“real” question is the Step Two issue of what the proper rule should be. One
rule might be that an attorney is obligated to put a client who intends to perjure
him or herself on the stand. Another rule might be that an attorney may not put
the client on the stand. Once the Step Two choice is made (no easy matter as
demonstrated by the great volume of scholarly commentary on the question34),
the Step Three conclusion inescapably follows like a basic equation in
mathematics.
B.

Recent Developments: The Contextual Turn

Recent academic discourse on ethics critiques formalism as too simplistic
and mechanistic. Often this critical discourse focuses on the importance of
“context” to ethical decision-making. While the meaning of “context” is not
always clear, it tends to embody distaste for abstractions and rigid categories,
as well as a greater sensitivity towards the complexity of practice in general35
and ethical decision-making in particular.36

which moral law pertains to it [step two], and figuring out what action that moral law requires for
the given situation [step three].” Id.
31. See James R. Elkins, Lawyer Ethics: A Pedagogical Mosaic, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 117, 126 (2000) (“the law school study of lawyer ethics is first and
foremost the application of a body of ethical rules”). See also supra text accompanying notes 117. Although not common in ethics analysis, an interesting phenomenon is the rise of explicit
“balancing tests” that empower decision-makers to exercise discretion. See Jane C. Murphy,
Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child Support Experiment, 70
N.C. L. REV. 209, 209-12 (1991) (tracking twentieth-century expansion of judicial discretion);
Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1441, 1465 (1990) (noting that the rise of “balancing tests” assimilates the legal realist critique of
formalism). While such rules may empower decisionmakers to consider a range of factors in
rendering decisions, the problem remains that the facts that get plugged into these factors are
rarely the subject of critical inquiry.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6; infra text accompanying notes 70-71, 86-90.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
34. See supra text accompanying note 2.
35. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye
Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1152-54 (1993) (criticizing a “traditional model of legal
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The reasons for this “contextual turn” are complex and varied. They
appear to reflect related trends within jurisprudence,37 philosophy,38 and other
social sciences,39 and especially the influence of feminist perspectives, which
often embrace the value of understanding moral and ethical judgment “in
context” as opposed to merely examining the application of abstract
principles.40
The meaning of “context” in ethics discourse, however, tends to focus
exclusively on rules. Sometimes this focus is explicit. For example, a number
of scholars have critiqued the development of “general, universal rules of
ethics” and instead have urged the adoption of rules that would only apply to
specific practice contexts.41 One commentator—David Wilkins—articulates

ethics” comprised of “broadly stated principles” and a “uniform enforcement system” that are not
sensitive to the different types of practice engaged in by lawyers).
36. This is especially true of the work of William Simon and David Luban, whose
scholarship I discuss infra text accompanying notes 47-72.
37. See, e.g., Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597
(1990); Catharine Pierce Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1990).
Issues of context—especially in the sense of the importance of understanding the socioeconomic
circumstances in which law arises—were also an important element of legal realism. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 164-71 (William W. Fisher et al., eds. 1993).
38. Although far from consistent, the many forms of “postmodernism” do tend “to reject the
idea of a universal, cohesive code of moral rules put in place by authoritarian institutions.”
Kupfer, supra note 28, at 62. “Context” is an especially important element of “pragmatism”—a
stance that has recently experienced some resurgence. See Morris Dickstein, Introduction:
Pragmatism Then and Now, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL
THOUGHT, LAW AND CULTURE 8 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) (“[p]ragmatism is always
contextual. It sees things not in isolation, not as essences existing in and of themselves, but as
belonging to contexts that shape their meaning and value”).
39. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics,
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 743-44 (2000) (discussing the rise of
“behavioral decision theory” in psychology as “[s]tudying the effect of context”); Brook K.
Baker, Beyond MacRate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological
Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 295-312 (1994) (describing “the emergence of a contextualist
cognitive science”); Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of
Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 129-30 (1999).
40. Feminist perspectives often emphasize “contextual factors” as a component of the “ethic
of care” articulated by Carol Gilligan and others. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4;
Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665 (1993); Janet
Taber et al., Project, Gender, Legal Education and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of
Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1250 (1988). See also CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT
(1982).
41. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 515. For another article that has similar goals but a different
methodology, see Fred Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169
(1997). See also Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993). Indeed, there has been an explosion of
ethics codes governing specific types of practice. See Zacharias, supra, at 190 (collecting
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these contexts as including the types and location of practice (such as
plaintiffs’ or defendants’ attorneys, or attorneys in large or small cities),42 the
posture of a given case (such as arguments to a judge as opposed to
negotiations or client counseling sessions, which are usually not subject to
judicial review),43 and “practical constraints, such as time, resources, and
habit.”44 These analyses then propose rules that better take into account the
variegated circumstances in which ethical decision-making takes place.45
Sometimes, however, the focus on rules is less obvious. This is so in the
work of William H. Simon and David Luban. Simon and Luban are the most
influential theorists addressing the question of “whether lawyers are morally
justified in fulfilling their traditional roles.”46 Both Simon and Luban are
“activists” in this regard: they argue that lawyers should at times act in ways
that are inconsistent with the goals of their clients in order to vindicate other
values. In reaching this position, Simon and Luban embrace “context,” spurn
citations to “specialized codes of conduct covering lawyers engaged in particular areas of
practice”). For some examples, see American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, The Bounds of
Advocacy: American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Standards of Conduct, 9 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 1, 3 (1992); Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform
Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. L. J. 45 (1998). A long-standing distinction
sometimes drawn in the literature is between different ethical obligations in civil and criminal
practice. Murray Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543;
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-66 (1988).
42. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 486-87.
43. Id. at 517. An influential article that also draws this distinction is Murray Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 677-79 (1978) (suggesting
that the “zealous advocate” model of lawyering might not apply in non-advocacy contexts).
44. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 515-16.
45. Issues of fact indeterminacy and fact-finding are rarely addressed in these critiques. For
an exception, see id. at 482. These efforts are subject to another important critique: an emphasis
on formally adopted, written ethical rules assumes that lawyers routinely consult ethics codes and
that they would welcome codes more finely tuned to the many contexts and contingencies of
practice. In fact, it is more likely that busy lawyers only look at ethics codes when they have to,
and often not even then. For example, one commentator persuasively argues that most lawyers
and judges in fact do not regularly consult legal rules as set forth in written texts, but instead rely
on “mental models” of what the law is. See Lopucki, supra note 25, at 1510-11. As one
commentator has put it when describing strenuous debates about modifying confidentiality rules,
“[w]here the rubber meets the road, it isn’t going to make a whole lot of difference.” Michael D.
Goldhaber, Blowing a Whistle on Client Misdeeds, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at A10 (quoting
John Toothman).
46. For a summary and critique of this debate, see Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral
Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1995). See also Heidi Li Feldman, Apparently
Substantial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice of Justice, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1472 (1999)
(citing Simon and Luban as two leading commentators on legal ethics). While especially
prominent, Simon and Luban are representative of a larger group of commentators who believe
that a focus on ethical codes impoverishes ethics discourse. This diverse group of commentators
look instead to moral philosophy and, in the case of Thomas Shaffer, to religion. See, e.g.,
Tremblay, supra, at 13-20; Johnson, supra note 17, at 25-29.
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unreflective, formalist views of rules, and look beyond written codes of ethics
for guidance in ethical decision-making. However, they continue to adhere to
the “given the facts” assumptions underlying conventional models of ethical
decision-making. In this sense, while these theories are anything but formalist
in their treatment of “the law,” they are at bottom formalist in their treatment
of facts.
1.

William Simon’s “Practice of Justice”

Perhaps the preeminent contextualist in legal ethics is William H. Simon.
In a series of influential articles47 and in an important recent book,48 Simon
critiques traditional views of lawyers’ roles and develops a comprehensive new
theory of legal ethics.
Simon critiques what he calls the “Dominant View” of lawyer’s ethics.
The Dominant View holds that “the lawyer must—or at least may—pursue any
goal of the client though any arguably legal course of action and assert any
non-frivolous legal claim.”49 The Dominant View adheres to a “categorical”
style of decision-making in which “a rigid rule dictates a particular response in
the presence of a small number of factors.”50
In contrast to the Dominant View, Simon argues for what he calls
“contextualized judgment” by lawyers when resolving problems of legal
ethics. Instead of the traditional notion that the primary—if not exclusive—
role of lawyers is to pursue clients’ goals and ignore other interests at stake,
lawyers should “take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances
of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”51 Consequently, when
justice so dictates, attorneys should act to the detriment of a client and in favor
of third parties or the public interest.52 The style of ethical decision-making
associated with this justice orientation is not a “mechanical” and “mindless”

47. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 217
(1988); William H. Simon, “Thinking Like a Lawyer” about Ethical Questions, 27 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Simon, Thinking Like a Lawyer]; William H. Simon, Should Lawyers
Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217 (1996); William H. Simon, The Trouble with
Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65 (1991).
48. SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5. This work has already generated significant
scholarly commentary, including a symposium issue devoted solely to the book. Symposium,
Review Essay Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REV. 867 (1999).
49. SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 7.
50. Id. at 9. Simon’s “categorical style of decision-making” is similar to my earlier
description of the three-step process of formalism. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
51. SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 138.
52. Simon does not suggest that lawyers should do so in all circumstances. To the contrary,
Simon is careful to note that such “moral activism” is warranted only when it appears that there is
no “institutional competence,” that is, the system of adjudication has broken down in a particular
situation, thus forcing a lawyers’ hand as an institutional actor to insure that justice is done. Id. at
154-55.
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application of ethical rules,53 but rather a consideration of “contextual
standards” of justice, thereby “engag[ing] the lawyer’s capacities for complex
reflection.”54
Simon’s view that lawyers have a responsibility to act in the interests of
justice—and his sense that justice is a matter of context—expands and enriches
the norms that lawyers should take into account when resolving ethical
problems. Simon’s analysis, however, retains conventional fact formalism.
Simon wants to enrich “the range of considerations the decision-maker may
take into account when she confronts a particular problem,”55 but the
“particular problem” remains predefined. Indeed, the “particular problem” is
implicitly determinate and concrete in its particulars, while the complexity and
flexibility arises through determining what norms justice may require.
Similarly, Simon notes that lawyers should “take those actions that,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to
promote justice,”56 but the challenging task of “considering” what the
“relevant circumstances of the particular case” are drops out as not worthy of
independent inquiry. In addition, the “essence” of “contextual judgment” is
that it “applies relatively abstract norms to a broad range of the particulars of
the case at hand.”57 The challenge of interpreting these “particulars,”
however, remains unexamined.
The examples Simon uses to illustrate his conception of justice further
demonstrate how issues of fact are submerged in his analysis. In discussing
the actions of the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in
representing Lincoln Savings & Loan, Simon sets forth the government’s
allegations against the firm with only a parenthetical reference to how these
allegations are “disputed by Kaye Scholer.”58 This “given these facts”
perspective serves Simon well when he later discusses how Kaye Scholer
should have been more candid with government investigators under Simon’s
view of attorneys’ obligation to justice.59 However, as I discuss in greater
53. Id. at 15.
54. Simon, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 47, at 6. Although Simon is not entirely
clear as to his intended meaning of “context,” he sets out in detail “considerations” that attorneys
should take into account in promoting justice. One consideration would be the proper rules
embodying “the basic values of the legal system,” which comprise not only positive law, but also
“vaguely specified aspirational norms.” SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 138.
Another consideration is whether procedures in a given case will promote justice; “the more
reliable the relevant procedures and institutions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need
assume for the substantive justice of the resolution,” and vice versa. Id. at 140. Presumably these
two “considerations” determine “context.”
55. Simon, Thinking Like a Lawyer, supra note 47, at 9 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 166-68.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1198

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1185

detail below60 and as Simon has acknowledged elsewhere,61 the facts
surrounding Kaye Scholer’s representation of Keating and Lincoln were far
more uncertain than Simon’s discussion allows. By adopting the scholarly
equivalent of a judge assuming that all “well pled facts are true,” Simon
eliminates fact-finding as a subject of his inquiry.62
Simon’s assault on formalism in ethics discourse, therefore, extends only
to rules. 63 He remains a fact formalist.
2.

David Luban’s “Moral Activism”

Like Simon, David Luban has wrestled with conflicts between the
traditional imperatives of legal ethics and other moral obligations.64 While
60. See infra text accompanying notes 138-51.
61. See William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the
Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 245 (1998) (“we have
limited knowledge of the facts” of Kaye, Scholer’s actions in the Keating matter, and “one
risks . . . doing an injustice to Kaye Scholer” by assuming the charges against the firm to be true).
62. Another example Simon uses is an interesting case study in how ethics discourse
simplifies facts in order to illuminate conflicts of principle. Simon draws upon a classic ethical
dilemma that is purportedly historical: “In about 1914 Arthur Powell, a Georgia lawyer, received
information from a client establishing the innocence of Leo Frank. Frank had been convicted in
Atlanta of the murder of a young girl at a trial notoriously marred by anti-Semitism and mob
hysteria. Because the client would not consent to disclosure, Powell did not communicate this
information to anyone.” After his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, Frank was
lynched by a mob. SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 4. Frank’s innocence, the
blatantly unfair nature of his trial, and the horrors of his lynching are all beyond dispute.
However, the setup of the ethical dilemma is not: Simon tellingly acknowledges in a footnote that
he “assume[s] for heuristic purposes that the information [about the identity of the murderer]
came from the real murderer, although Powell’s account is ambiguous on this point.” Id. at 236.
In fact, Powell’s account never even hints that the information came from a client, let alone the
real murderer; he only states that he “can never reveal it [make public the source of the
information] so long as certain persons are alive.” ARTHUR G. POWELL, I CAN GO HOME AGAIN
291 (1943). Powell also notes that Jack Slaton, the governor of Georgia at the time, also knew of
Frank’s innocence although Powell never discussed this fact with Slaton—a fact that, if anything,
suggests that the source of Powell’s information was not a client. Id.
63. Interestingly, Simon does mention how sometimes lawyers “talk of abstract norms as
subjective and of facts as indeterminate,” but he criticizes this stance as equivalent to a
conception of decision-making that “is necessarily arbitrary.” SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE,
supra note 5, at 10. I address this fear of fact indeterminacy infra text accompanying notes 109114.
64. Luban’s most comprehensive treatment of his basic ideas is in LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE, supra note 2. Another influential work by Luban is his earlier anthology, THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983). In many respects,
Simon and Luban are, in Luban’s words, “kindred spirits” in their shared critique of onedimensional “adversarial ethics” which fails to recognize ethical commitments by lawyers
separate and apart from lawyers’ roles as advocates. David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal
Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 874 (1999). Luban and Simon, however, do differ in that, for
example, Luban finds these commitments in “morality” while Simon finds them in “justice” as
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Simon argues that “legal ethics” should encompass the idea of “justice,”65
Luban frames his argument in terms of resolving tensions between legal ethics
(or, to put it in Luban’s terms, obligations implicated by a lawyer’s “role
morality”) and “common morality.”66 In so doing, Luban critiques what he
calls the “institutional excuse” or, as applied to lawyers, “the adversary system
excuse.”67 Through such a justification, a lawyer (or anyone playing a social
role) “excuse[s] herself from conduct that would be morally culpable were
anyone else to do it” because it is the social role, not the individual actor, that
dictates the action.68
Luban’s critique of the “institutional excuse” is far too detailed and
complex to summarize adequately here. His general approach, however, is
instructive. Luban’s analytic model for how ethical problems should be
resolved is what he calls “the fourfold root of sufficient reasoning.” This
model holds that when confronted by ethical dilemmas, lawyers should
analyze: 1) the adversary system and its justifications; 2) the role of an
advocate and “its derivation from the institution’s requirements;” 3) the nature
of the implicated role obligation “and its derivation from the role’s
requirements;” and 4) the actual act at issue “and the demonstration that it is an
instance of the role obligation.”69
Among Luban’s examples designed to illustrate the application of his
“fourfold root” is that of “a lawyer defending a rapist, whose client has
informed the lawyer that he is guilty, but who insists on offering as a defense
the falsehood that the victim consented to have sex with him.”70 The ethical
question is whether the lawyer can cross-examine the victim about her sex life
and use the testimony of an ex-boyfriend as corroboration. Luban’s analysis
shirks easy answers; he wrestles not only with the interest of the adversary
system in protecting criminal defendants, but also with the interest of the
adversary system in “ensur[ing] that rape victims can step forward to accuse
their assailants without their own sexuality being turned into the centerpiece of
the trial.”71 However, the familiar fact formalism remains; it is the rare client

embodied in “law.” Id. at 875-876. See Tremblay, supra note 46, at 22-67 (comparing and
critiquing the theories of Simon and Luban).
65. SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 138.
66. See, e.g., LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 105-46.
67. Id. at 54-56.
68. Id. at 56. Luban’s idea of an “institutional excuse” is a broad term meant to encompass
how anyone, including a lawyer, uses her “role in a social institution” to excuse conduct that
would otherwise be morally questionable. Id. See also David Luban, The Adversary System
Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 84-113 (1983).
69. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 132.
70. Id. at 150.
71. Id. at 151. Luban eventually concludes by “a very close call” that the attorney should
not cross-examine the victim about her sex life. Id. at 152. This factual scenario is a common
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indeed who, in the typically bland style of fact hypotheticals, “informs the
lawyer that he is guilty.” Far more common are shades of gray: determining
the truthfulness of witnesses (whether the witness is your client or the exboyfriend) over time and folding these determinations into constructing an
effective defense.
Luban’s analysis, however, also offers deeper insights into the assumptions
underlying fact formalism. In terms of time and complexity, Luban’s “fourfold
root of sufficient reasoning” is quite an order to fill for a practicing attorney.
Luban’s response to this objection is fascinating:
[T]he most cerebral parts of the deliberation, the abstract evaluation of the
institution, role, and role obligations contained in the first three links of the
fourfold root, need not be done over and over again. The purposes and
justifications of your occupational role and the institutions in terms of which it
exists are familiar: you must come to grips with them some time in your
career, but they do not have to be reinvented each time you confront a
dilemma. They don’t have to be thought through by you personally, except to
assess their relevance to the case at hand: you can read about what justifies
confidentiality, or the adversary system, in a book like this one. The only
deliberative acts that must be performed on the spot are those needed to bring
these rather abstract assessments to bear on the dilemma at hand. And this
may take seconds to think through—we are talking, after all, of deliberation,
not a cost-benefit analysis by Coopers & Lybrand.72

Consider the vision of time implied by Luban’s analysis. Attorneys should
expend long hours of deliberative study on “abstract evaluation.” In contrast,
the fact-based dimension of ethical decision-making is effortless. The time
required to apply rules to facts is an “on the spot” process that requires only
“seconds to think through.” Moreover, the process of determining what the
facts are does not even warrant mention; facts are already—as Luban notes
twice—”at hand,” and thus their interpretation or investigation impliedly
requires no effort at all. Luban also values “abstract deliberation” as “the most
cerebral” aspect of his model. In contrast, the fact-based elements of his model
are mechanistic and undemanding. It is easy to see how the mythical client
“who has informed his lawyer that he is guilty” fits easily into this factually
bare environment.
Luban’s description of his model is a rarity: an explicit discussion of the
temporal world implied by the fact formalism that typifies ethics discourse
generally.

one in ethics discourse. For further discussion of this example, see infra text accompanying notes
86-87.
72. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
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D. Fact-Finding in Ethics Discourse: Three Examples
While largely marginalized, ethics discourse does address fact-finding in
three related areas of inquiry: the issue of what lawyers “know” (the
“epistemology problem”), the issue of attorneys who consciously avoid
knowledge of their clients’ activities (the “avoidance of knowledge” or
“contrived ignorance” problem), and the issue of an attorney’s “standard of
knowledge” of client wrongdoing. While these topics offer insights into the
role of facts in ethical decision-making, they are also important for what they
do not address. I will review each of these issues in turn.
1.

“Can Lawyers Know the Truth?”

One way to describe theories of adjudication is through the analogy of how
umpires call balls and strikes in baseball.73 An umpire might claim that balls
and strikes “ain’t nothing until I call them.”74 Even if an umpire is “wrong”
under the terms of some sort of “objective” criteria, the rules of the game
mandate that a ball is only a ball and a strike is only a strike if the umpire says
so. The players in the game must abide by this “truth” if the game is to have
meaning.
A similar point arises in ethics discourse in the context of a lawyer’s
obligation not to present perjured testimony.75 One argument holds that
lawyers can never “know” the truth or falsity of a defense, fact, or claim until it
is found to be true or false by a finder of fact, that is, a judge or jury. In other
words, in the specialized world of adjudication, the only meaningful “truth” is
“legal truth” as found by judges or juries—the “umpires” of adjudication—and
not by lawyers.76 Since lawyers are not umpires and thus can never “know”
the truth in this sense, they can assert a “false” defense, fact, or claim at trial
without suborning perjury because it is not “legally false.”
This issue played an important role in a noted scholarly debate between
Harry I. Subin and John B. Mitchell about whether a criminal lawyer has a
“right” to present a false defense.77 Subin’s position is that once a criminal

73. See Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104
YALE L.J. 227, 233-34 (1994).
74. Id. at 234.
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1996).
76. As with many other issues in legal ethics, Monroe Freedman was an early and influential
commentator on this subject. See FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 1, at 51-58. As
Freedman observes, the intellectual pedigree of this idea extends at least as far back as Samuel
Johnson, who observed that a lawyer does not know a “cause . . . to be bad . . . till the Judge
determines it.” Id. at 51.
77. Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission:” Reflections on the “Right”
to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987) [hereinafter Subin, Reflections];
John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor
Subin’s Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission,” 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339
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defense attorney finds that the “state’s case is legally and factually sound,” the
defense attorney cannot affirmatively propound inconsistent evidence; rather,
the attorney should only “monitor” that the state prove “all of the elements of
the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.”78 Subin rejects the “legal truth”
argument—the position that “[t]he truth, insofar as it is relevant to the lawyer,
is what the trier of fact determines it to be.”79 Subin argues that “[p]lainly one
can know the factual truth” and it is the “factual truth” that is at issue in ethical
rules.80
In contrast, Mitchell holds that attorneys must be affirmative advocates and
never mere “monitors.” Mitchell argues that in the adversary system, “there
are not such things as facts,” but “only information, lack of information, and
chains of inferences therefrom.”81 According to Mitchell, a “false defense” is
not false; it instead seeks to weaken the state’s inferences by presenting
alternative inferences and plausible stories of “what happened.” As a result,
“legal truth” is the only truth at issue in adjudication and he intimates without
elaboration his belief that historical facts are never “knowable” in Subin’s
“factual truth” sense.82
The Subin/Mitchell debate takes an important step: it identifies issues of
fact as worthy of scrutiny. The debate also hints at some of the complexities
underlying the process of attorney fact-finding. As Subin admits, “in most
cases the defense attorney will not have the degree of certainty as to the facts”
—that is, the “factual truth”—to conclude that a “false defense” is even at
issue.83 Mitchell goes further by alluding to deeper epistemic concerns about
the certainty of knowing “factual truth” however distinguished from “legal
truth.”84 Nevertheless, while these statements are a relatively rare recognition
in ethics discourse of the difficulty of fact-finding, they continue to leave this
process unexplored. 85
Moreover, like Simon and Luban, Subin and Mitchell adhere to the
conventions of ethics discourse by constructing hypotheticals that assume
simple, determinate sets of facts. Subin supports his position through a
(1987). Subin replied to Mitchell in Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections
On The Right To Present A False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 689 (1988) [hereinafter
Subin, Further Reflections].
78. Subin, Reflections, supra note 77, at 147.
79. Id. at 136.
80. Id. at 138.
81. Mitchell, supra note 77, at 345. Monroe Freedman adheres to a similar position. See
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 1, at 53.
82. Mitchell, supra note 77, at 350-51.
83. Subin, Further Reflections, supra note 77, at 702.
84. Mitchell, supra note 77, at 343.
85. Another limitation of the factual truth/legal truth debate is that it only has meaning in the
context of litigation. In the numerous practice contexts where there is no decision-maker, “legal
truth” is meaningless because there is no judge to give it content.
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variation on the factually thin hypothetical also employed by David Luban:86
an attorney must decide whether it is permissible to present a defense of
consent in a rape case when the client has “admitted his guilt” that he forcibly
raped a victim without her consent.87
Mitchell makes comparable moves. Mitchell sets forth a hypothetical
involving a woman accused of stealing a Christmas tree ornament. To simplify
matters, this client also admits her guilt, including her unambiguous admission
to her attorney that she fully intended to steal the ornament.88 In a subsequent
hypothetical, Mitchell is representing a client accused of robbery. Mitchell has
“seen the victim at a preliminary hearing, and based upon the circumstances of
the identification and my overall impression of the witness, I am certain that he
is truthful and accurate.”89 The factual simplifications of this second example
are especially strained: after all, “circumstances” and “impressions” tend to
produce possibilities and rarely (if ever) certainties.90
Nevertheless, the “factual truth/legal truth” debate at least offers
intimations that there are, at a minimum, multiple ways of looking at facts,
and, at least in Mitchell’s view, no “right” way to view facts at all.
2.

Avoidance of Knowledge

Some commentators have noted that attorneys on occasion willfully avoid
knowing facts.91 This “avoidance of knowledge” maneuver seeks to sidestep
the thorny issue of determining what evidence is merely “misleading” or
“plausible,” and thus fair game at trial, from what is false or perjured, and thus
illegitimate.92 In the paradigmatic “avoidance of knowledge” situation, a
criminal defense lawyer does not ask her client whether the client “did it,”
thereby preserving the attorney’s freedom to decide what evidence to adduce at
trial without having to worry about whether the evidence is false or perjured.93
As a result, attorneys can develop evidence that is helpful to the case while

86. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
87. Subin, Reflections, supra note 77, at 133. For yet another formulation of this
hypothetical, see, FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 1, at 43-45.
88. Mitchell, supra note 77, at 343-44.
89. Id. at 352.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 119-55.
91. For a recent and thoughtful treatment of this issue see David Luban, Contrived
Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999). See also STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 402 (1998).
92. As demonstrated by the Subin/Mitchell debate, the issue of whether criminal defense
attorneys can present a “false” defense is a live issue that is the subject of debate. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-90. However, there is no question that ethical rules would prohibit the
presentation of specific evidence that an attorney “knows to be false.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1996).
93. Luban, supra note 91, at 957-58.
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maintaining a scrupulous ignorance about whether this evidence reflects what
“really happened.”94
One obvious problem with this technique is that by solving one ethical
issue it raises another. If, as is often the case, an attorney suspects that
evidence is false, further fact investigation relating to the evidence might lead
to important information critical to the representation. Ms. Cooper’s case is a
good example:95 the issue of substance abuse is not merely a matter of ethics,
but a matter that is at the core of legal issues relating to Ms. Cooper’s
entitlement to benefits and strategic questions about how to handle the issue at
the hearing. By merely “avoiding knowledge” of Ms. Cooper’s substance
abuse, an attorney is ignoring facts that are crucial to case development and
preparation and that may explode negatively at a hearing. As such, “avoidance
of knowledge” may lead to incompetent representation.
In any event, the issue of “avoidance of knowledge” does illuminate a
crucial insight about facts and ethical decision-making: the reason that the
“avoidance of knowledge” strategy could work at all is that attorneys
confronting ethical problems are their own finders of fact. Since every ethical
rule requires a factual predicate and lawyers themselves determine whether
such a factual predicate exists, attorneys can control the process of ethical
decision-making through fact-finding. This deceptively simple point—rarely
acknowledged in ethics discourse—demonstrates the extraordinary impact of
fact-finding on ethical decision-making.96

94. While there is relatively little scholarship on the “avoidance of knowledge” issue, the
ABA has criticized this strategy in a number of ethics opinions. See ABA Comm. On Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 n.9 (1987) (lawyers who “follow a practice of not
questioning the client about the facts in the case and, therefore, never ‘know’ that a client has
given false testimony . . . may be violating their duties under Rule 3.3”). See also ABA Comm.
On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1470 (1981), which states:
A lawyer cannot escape responsibility by avoiding inquiry. A lawyer must be satisfied,
on the facts before him and readily available to him, that he can perform the requested
services without abetting fraudulent or criminal conduct and without relying on past client
crime or fraud to achieve results the client now wants.
David Luban, however, does not support prohibiting “contrived ignorance.” Luban argues that
such a rule would inject suspicion into the attorney/client relationship because the lawyer “may
be forced to play a cat-and-mouse game of sleuthing against her own evasive clients.” See
Luban, supra note 91, at 976-77.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
96. See Freedman, Three Hardest Questions, supra note 1, at 1472 (while “a defense
attorney can remain selectively ignorant . . . [i]t is inconceivable, however, that an attorney could
give adequate counsel under such circumstances” because “a lawyer can never anticipate all of
the innumerable and potentially critical factors that his client, once cautioned, may decide not to
reveal.”); FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 1, at 30 (“[P]rofessional responsibility
requires that an advocate have full knowledge of every pertinent fact,” and thus “the lawyer must
seek the truth from the client, not shun it.”). Similarly, an ABA Ethics Opinion concludes that
failure to question “the client about the facts” in order to avoid ethical problems raises the
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That said, “avoidance of knowledge” as commonly formulated only goes
so far. The issue presupposes a conscious, strategic decision by an attorney to
“avoid knowledge.” While at least implicitly alluding to the power of factfinding, this simplified scenario sidesteps the far more complex processes at
play when attorneys confront factual uncertainty97 or are subject to the many
influences that may favor one finding of fact over another.98 Thus, while
“avoidance of knowledge” demonstrates the importance of attorney factfinding, it is not an especially useful vehicle for exploring the complexities of
fact-finding in practice.99
3.

Standards of Knowledge

A final issue relating to fact-finding that on occasion percolates in ethics
discourse involves “standards of knowledge”—the degree to which an attorney
should be certain as to facts before ethical obligations are triggered. Again the
paradigmatic situation relates to the client perjury problem. The “standard of
knowledge” question here is how certain an attorney should be about a client’s
perjury before the attorney undertakes (using the language of the ABA Model
Rules) “reasonable remedial measures.”100
In exploring these issues, most commentators explicitly or implicitly adopt
the language of burdens of proof.101 Subin, for example, asserts that a criminal
defense attorney should be limited to a monitoring role only when an attorney
believes “beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defense is false.102 The standard
possibility of incompetent representation.
ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 n.9 (1987). See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-4.1(a) (1993) (“Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the
case and the penalty in the event of conviction.”).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 136-51.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 167-86.
99. I suggest a broader, more “factually thick” approach to “avoidance of knowledge” after
discussing in detail the process of fact-finding. See infra text accompanying notes 232-36.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1996).
101. See, e.g., Carol T. Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional
and Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121, 149 (1985) (proposing that lawyers must “be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the client’s testimony will be perjurious” before
declining to present the testimony); FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 1, at 54 (in
exploring an attorney’s duties in the face of client perjury, an important question is “whether the
standard of knowledge should be based upon certainty, belief beyond a reasonable doubt, clear
and convincing evidence, etc”).
102. Subin, Reflections, supra note 77, at 142. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
See also United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating “a clear expression of
intent to commit perjury is required before an attorney can reveal client confidences”); Grievance
Committee of the United States District Court v. Federal Grievance Committee, 847 F.2d 57, 61
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding in order for an attorney to have an “ethical duty to report a fraud on the
court . . . the lawyer must have ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that a fraud on the court has
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of knowledge question therefore recognizes degrees of uncertainty inherent in
the process of attorney fact-finding, and, as with the Subin/Mitchell debate,
this highlights an important dimension of facts and ethical decision-making.
Nevertheless, while offering rules about the requisite certainty for findings
of fact, the “standard of knowledge” issue does not explore the process of factfinding. It does not address, for example, how an attorney can or should go
about determining the degree to which the attorney is “certain” of facts,103 or
issues relating to an attorney’s control over decisions about the degree of
“certainty,”104 or what influences an attorney in determining whether the
requisite level of certainty has been met.105
D. Why Are Facts Devalued in Ethics Discourse?
The discussion thus far has explored the at most peripheral role that factfinding plays in ethics discourse. Before examining the process of fact-finding
in detail, it is worth a brief detour to examine the fascinating question of why
facts are marginalized in the first place. While a full exploration of this
question exceeds the scope of this Article, the beginnings of an answer may be
found in assumptions embedded in Western moral philosophy as well as in the
conventions of legal analysis.
First, there is a deep-seated bias against facts and “particulars” in a great
deal of moral philosophy that extends at least as far back as Plato. Plato’s
famous metaphor of the cave from The Republic describes a “realm of
unchanging existence” called the Forms, and “the educational system will have
to be directed and controlled by those who already have made the prerequisite
ascent from the vision of particulars to the vision of the Forms.”106 A related
Western bias values constancy over change and holds that “it is possible to
decontextualize propositions.”107 In such a world, pure, universal forms and
unchanging rules are the goals of serious inquiry, while the importance of the
occurred “). In addition, the issue of standards of knowledge for attorneys concerned Justices
O’Connor and White during the oral argument for Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986)
discussed infra text accompanying notes 273-77, although the published opinion does not address
the issue. See Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered
Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939, 1940-1946 (1988).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 124-51.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 167-86.
106. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 53 (1998). See PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC 316-325 (Desmond Lee trans., Penguin 2d ed. 1974) (noting that “the mind as a
whole must be turned away from the world of change until its eye can bear to look straight at
reality”).
107. Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning About
Contradiction, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741, 742 (1999). This view is in contrast to others,
particularly Buddhist, which emphasize that “the world is in constant flux.” Id.
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“vision of the particulars” is recognized less, and the inherent ambiguity and
fluidity of these “particulars” is recognized less still.108
Second, despite Holmes’ endlessly repeated observation that “the life of
the law is not logic, but experience,”109 rule-based logic and its attendant claim
of rationality continue to define the methodology of law.110 The origins of this
tendency are complex. Perhaps one answer is that a core justification for
adherence to law is that it is subject to “neutral” application through logic and
reason: rules equally constrain everyone and thereby prevent despotism and
anarchy by inhibiting the unbridled discretion of those in power.111 If
generality is the key, then the best way to test generality, and thus the efficacy
of rules, is to apply rules to as many particular situations as possible.112 In this
sense, facts are useful only insofar as they demonstrate the propriety of rules.
The uncertainty and complexity so pervasive in fact-finding clouds this picture,
and thus the fact-finding process tends to get submerged.113

108. There, of course, have been critics of this emphasis on the “universal,” from Aristotle to,
most recently, American pragmatists, feminists, and postmodernists. See Tremblay, supra note
30, at 510 (referring to philosophical challenges to the Platonic tradition’s elevation of “rules,
abstract principles, and universal truths” over the “particular”). For example, the pragmatist John
Dewey, whose ideas are currently enjoying a resurgence, wrote how “unreconciled diversity,”
“the recalcitrant particular . . . the ambiguousness and ambivalence of reality” has wrongfully
been relegated to a “metaphysically inferior” stance in contrast to “unity” and “permanence.”
JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 46 (1926). Among legal scholars, the legal realists
often derided conceptions of law that viewed it as a construct of “absolute purity, freed from all
entangling alliances with human life.” Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
109. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
110. See generally SCHLAG, supra note 14.
111. See, e.g., LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 49 (“It is only its generality,
its fairness, that elevates law from a coercive system to a system exerting moral—and not just
physical—force. Undermine generality and you undermine the very legitimacy of law, reducing
it once again to coercion.”). See also SCHLAG, supra note 14, at 20 (reason and the rule of law “is
the mechanism by which emotions, interests, and force are supposedly kept in check”).
112. This view draws inspiration from the comfortable precision of classical physics, where
the “truth” of rules are empirically verifiable. In physics this comfortable realm has been shaken
in the twentieth-century through Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle and Godel’s Theorem, which
holds that every proof must, in turn, ultimately rest upon an unprovable assumption. See, e.g.,
GEORGE JOHNSON, FIRE IN THE MIND: SCIENCE, FAITH, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 43, 31516 (1995).
113. There also might be a cognitive bias at work here as well: research has shown that
people “have a strong preference for the elimination of uncertainty.” Donald C. Langevoort,
Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature
Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739,
747-48 (2000) (describing cognitive “aversion to ambiguity”). See also infra text accompanying
notes 126-34.
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Third, if rule-based logic is the touchstone of legal analysis, the discovery
and articulation of facts also must itself be a strictly rational process. If this is
not the case, fact-finding becomes a kind of joker in the deck introducing an
unconstrained, erratic element into the otherwise orderly process of legal
analysis and adjudication, thus endangering the legitimacy of the whole
enterprise. What happens, then, is that facts are presented as orderly and
certain, with the unspoken assumption being that this order and certainty are
constrained by reason.114 The consequence is that the underlying messiness
and indeterminacy of fact-finding are submerged.
Fourth, fact investigation does not appear to be a technical exercise that
requires “professional” expertise. To the contrary, as we navigate through the
world, interpreting facts is done all the time by everyone, lawyers and nonlawyers alike, and thus (so the assumption goes) it does not warrant intensive
scrutiny in legal scholarship or in law school.115 Indeed, the preeminent
“finders of fact” in the adversary system are not legal professionals, but lay
juries.116 In contrast to this view, however, some scholars have explored in
depth how critical fact investigation (and the narratives that emerge from it)
and the related tasks of interviewing are to the art of lawyering.117

114. For a related analysis, see SCHLAG, supra note 14, at 25-26 (arguing that in legal
analysis, “the foreign criteria of reason such as coherence and consistency come to displace
experience and perception”).
115. This assumption is rarely articulated, but it is immanent in a great deal of discussion
about what lawyers do. To take just one example, the ABA has noted that large firms use
paralegals “largely for such routine tasks as conducting factual research, proofreading
documents, maintaining client files and monitoring deadlines.” Mark Hansen, Legal Secretary or
Lawyer Lite: Growing Use of Paralegal Raises Questions about Their Function, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1999, at 90 (emphasis added). The importance to the legal profession of focusing only on areas
that ostensibly require specialized knowledge extends at least as far back as Lord Coke, who
claimed before King James I that legal reasoning is not merely “natural reason,” but “artificial
reason.” Smith, supra note 27, at 1050-51.
116. This is not to say, of course, that there is not great anxiety among lawyers, judges, and
scholars about the “rationality” of such finders of fact. To the contrary, such anxiety is
manifested in the existence of rules of evidence and in wresting away fact-finding from lay juries
through such mechanisms as summary judgment and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. See
GEERTZ, supra note 24, at 171-72 (discussing the “general wariness about how information is
assessed in court” when “this assessment is given to amateurs to accomplish”). For a discussion
contrasting the constraints placed on fact-finding by juries with fact-finding by attorneys in
ethical decision-making, see infra text accompanying note 135.
117. The work of Anthony G. Amsterdam has been especially compelling in this regard. See,
e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 9
(1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall’s Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in Brown,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 226 (1993); Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing
Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992). See also Nancy Pennington & Reid
Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.
519 (1991).
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Finally, “law” has long been associated with “text,” and especially written
rules. The examination of written rules is a textual enterprise; while there
might be debate about what a rule means, there can be no disagreement about
what a rule says. This gives at least the appearance of determinacy. In
contrast, “facts” are, by their nature, extra-textual; “what happened” is never
merely a written text, but an open aggregation of impressions, emotions and
interactions, as well as a range of written documents that may include, among
other things, contracts, letters, notices, or transcripts. This extratextuality is far
more challenging to examine and far less subject to the appearance of a
systematic, orderly analysis than written rules.118 The open texture of facts
therefore renders conventional legal analysis of limited utility.
II. THE PROCESS OF FACT-FINDING IN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING
Thus far, I have explored how ethics discourse submerges and
marginalizes fact-finding. In this section, I offer an affirmative set of ideas
about the crucial and complicated role that fact investigation and fact-finding
play in ethical decision-making.
A.

The Construction of Facts as Controlling Results

The interpretation of facts may dictate a given result or dissolve ethical
problems entirely.119 This is because the application of every rule requires a
factual predicate, and whether or not the factual predicate exists controls the
result under a given rule.120 For example, if an attorney must “take reasonable
remedial measures” when a client has committed perjury,121 a finding that
either a client has not committed perjury or that it is unclear whether a client
has committed perjury dissolves the ethical dilemma. This renders moot the
question of what “reasonable remedial measures” to take.
Thus, the most incisive, comprehensive, and sensitive interpretation of
applicable rules, even if undertaken by the attorney equivalent of Ronald
Dworkin’s Judge Hercules—a figure “of superhuman intellectual power and
patience” 122—is powerless if fact-finding fails to establish the factual predicate
necessary to bring a given rule into play. In this sense, fact-finding is the deus
ex machina of ethical decision-making.123
118. Indeed, the rise of professional codes led to the emergence of legal ethics as an academic
discipline. Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 10, at 34; Pearce, supra note 6, at 722.
119. See Tremblay, supra note 46, at 29 (alluding to how, in practice, “whether there even is a
problem [of ethics] is often an open question”).
120. See supra text accompanying note 21.
121. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1990).
122. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986).
123. The legal realists also recognized the extraordinary impact of facts on judicial decisionmaking. See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 213 (David Kairys ed., 1990). Interestingly, the realist critique tended to refer to “facts” as
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Fact-Finding as an Interpretive Act

Fact-finding is an act of interpretation.124 If “[t]he central lesson of legal
realism for lawyers is that there will often be a range of credible interpretations
of the meaning of a given legal rule,”125 imagine the interpretive challenge
when the “text” is not merely a legal rule, but an array of meanings constructed
through inferences from a multiplicity of sources.
Psychologists have revealed cognitive lenses that inevitably come into play
when attorneys interpret facts.126 Mental shortcuts or “heuristics” shape and
filter what would otherwise be overwhelming sensory input when humans
construe situations.127 Examples include the “fundamental attribution error,”
through which “people tend to attribute their own actions to situational
factors . . . and the actions of others to stable personality traits”;128 a general
tendency “to favor explanations involving only one causal factor, even when

the socioeconomic context from which cases (and judges) arose, not facts in the sense of “what
happened” in a given case. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 108, at 810 (noting the importance of
“economic, sociological, political, or ethical questions” in resolving questions of law); LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, 3 (1986) (legal realism sought “to understand
law in terms of its factual context and economic and social consequences”).
124. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 482 (“Confronted with the same factual material, various legal
actors may easily reach different conclusions about the significance of a series of events.”); Paul
Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem
Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7 (1995) (“lawyers in everyday practice are called upon
to help clients arrange their future affairs in dynamically changing situations where the facts, as
well as the law, are anything but determinate”). Even the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
recognizes that “a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1990).
125. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 511-12.
126. Donald C. Langevoort in particular has explored some of the psychological dynamics at
play when attorneys confront issues of ethics. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the
Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility For Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 75, 95-96 (1993); Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853,
860-65 (1995). For a general review of psychology and legal scholarship, see Langevoort, supra
note 113.
127. Two leading studies of these processes are RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) and DANIEL
KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Cognitive shortcuts are inevitable among all humans and
thus distinct from different personalities or styles of reasoning, which might also influence how
attorneys construe facts. See Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 740; Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know
Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46
AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997) (gathering empirical research on the personality traits and styles of
moral reasoning of pre-law students, law students, and lawyers).
128. See Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV.
526, 548 (1994); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings, in 10 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 174, 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977).
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seeking the cause of complex events”;129 a general tendency to overestimate
the normalcy of our own experience, that is, the assumption that the experience
of others is similar to our own;130 difficulty representing and holding in mind
uncertainties;131 and a tendency called “confirmation bias,” through which we
“manage knowledge in a variety of ways to promote the selective availability
of information that confirms judgments already arrived at.”132 In the context of
ethical decision-making, these heuristics inevitably influence how attorneys
construe situations that implicate an ethical analysis.133 Moreover, these
processes are largely invisible: as a matter of cognition, “people fail to
recognize the degree to which their interpretations of the situation are just
that—constructions and inferences rather than faithful reflections of some
objective and invariant reality.”134
Although these cognitive processes remain relatively little known in legal
discourse and procedure, one adjudicative procedure—trial by jury—does at
least recognize the extraordinary interpretive challenge of fact-finding. The
norms, rules and procedures of trial practice are brimming with fears of
potential biases, inaccuracies, and uncertainties in fact-finding. Elaborate voir
dire procedures hope to root out juror bias. Intricate rules seek to identify
evidence that is reliable and probative enough for jurors to hear. Departures
from the norms and rules, if egregious enough, warrant mistrials and new trials
before fresh juries. Jurors are ordered not to discuss cases outside of trial or

129. Brest & Krieger, supra note 128, at 548.
130. Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human
Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 319, 337-338
(Mark P. Zann ed., 1991).
131. Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1504 (people “have a strong preference for the
elimination of uncertainty”); Lopucki, supra note 25, at 1521 (“cognitive systems have difficulty
representing indeterminacies”).
132. Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal
History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603, 606 (1980). In legal scholarship, the plasticity of memory
has been of particular interest to those addressing trial testimony by eyewitnesses. See
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 47-74 (1987).
133. See, e.g., Brest & Krieger, supra note 128, at 546 (lawyers, like all human beings, “tend
to . . . filter perception through the sieves of schemes, stereotypes, and theories, which let in
confirming data but re-interpret or exclude data that do not conform to our prior expectations”);
Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 685-86 (1994)
(“professionals’ recognition of ethical problems” is affected by “cognitive conservatism,” through
which attorneys “are more likely to register and retain information that is compatible with
established beliefs or earlier decisions”).
134. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 85 (1991). See also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 9 (1973) (“what we call our data are really our own constructions of other people’s
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to”).
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with other jurors until the conclusion of trial, and, in some instances, judges
will order that jurors be sequestered.135
Fact-finding by juries thus generates an enormous investment of time and
resources and a rich, detailed analysis. This is in marked contrast to the largely
invisible process through which lawyers conclude what the facts are for
purposes of ethical decision-making.
C. The Complexity and Uncertainty of Facts
Fact-finding is not only an act of interpretation, but also an extraordinarily
difficult and inexact act of interpretation.
A striking feature of ethical decision-making in practice is that people
enter the ethics picture not as the cardboard villains of fact hypotheticals, but
as individuals or (in the case of business organizations) as entities composed of
individuals. Flesh and blood people are full of contradictory motivations,
indecisiveness and complexity.136 At the foundation of many classic ethics
problems lies the not-so-simple question of construing motivations and actions
of human beings. When this task is further placed in the context of the
inferences that must be drawn from numerous sources in order to construe
situations, interpreting “facts” becomes, in many respects, the preeminent
characteristic—and the preeminent difficulty—of ethical decision-making.
Consider, for example, Ms. Cooper’s case.137 In order to engage in ethical
decision-making, you must interpret “the situation.” The situation involves
construing Ms. Cooper’s degree of substance abuse. This is a complicated
business. She might be a substantial and continuing drug abuser and thus lying
to get benefits (the most likely interpretation if Ms. Cooper’s case were to
become an example of the “client perjury problem”). However, she also might
be laboring under a mental impairment, including memory loss, or she might
be “telling the truth” as she sees it by creatively characterizing a continuing
problem that, as is often the case with substance abuse, ebbs and flows over
time. In addition, any interpretation would be informed not only by what Ms.
Cooper says, but also by a review of pertinent medical records that might be
ambiguous or incomplete, as well as by interviews with potential witnesses.
Your “interpretation,” therefore, is informed by a series of sub-interpretations
135. Of course, rules of evidence also apply in bench trials, but fears about the integrity of the
fact-finding process in bench trials are allayed through constructs like judicial “neutrality” and
lack of bias. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
136. See, e.g., Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1731 (1993); Rubinson, supra note 39, at 153; Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting
Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43 (1991). The
tendency to ascribe stable, negative character traits to clients might be an example of the
“fundamental attribution error” that I previously described. See supra text accompanying note
128.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
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of your conversations with Ms. Cooper, medical records, statements by other
witnesses, and other sources which define what “a case” is.
Another illustration in a very different context involves Charles Keating
and the Lincoln Savings & Loan Association.138 A prominent New York law
firm, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (Kaye Scholer), represented
Lincoln and its parent, the American Continental Corporation, during an
investigation of their financial practices by the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS). OTS later charged Kaye Scholer with failing to disclose material facts
to bank regulators and misrepresenting its clients’ financial practices, thereby
violating an array of statutes, agency regulations, and rules of ethics.139 After
issuing informal responses to the OTS charges,140 the firm settled for forty-one
million dollars prior to formal proceedings and six days after OTS issued a
“freeze” order that restricted the firm’s finances.141
This case has generated substantial commentary about whether Kaye
Scholer acted ethically in representing its clients and whether OTS acted
properly in pressing its case against Kaye Scholer.142 Despite an at best

138. Keating was Chairman and CEO of American Continental Corporation, of which
Lincoln Savings and Loan was a wholly-owned subsidiary. Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass’n v.
Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 906-07 (D.C. 1990). Keating was subsequently prosecuted and
convicted in state and federal court for a range of securities law violations and began serving
substantial concurrent sentences. The Ninth Circuit later reversed his federal convictions, after
which Keating pled guilty and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to time served.
United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit also overturned
Keating’s state conviction. Keating v. Hood, 191 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999). In the end, Keating
served five years in prison. Id. at 1055.
139. Given that OTS stood in the shoes of Lincoln and thereby became Kaye Scholer’s client,
OTS also charged Kaye Scholer with malpractice. Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New
Champions: Kaye, Scholer, The Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 985, 994-95 (1993). For summaries and analyses of the complex series of
transactions cited in the OTS charges, see id. at 988-1000, and Simon, supra note 61, at 247-58.
The OTS charges are reprinted in their entirety in Mary C. Daly, Lawyering After Kaye, Scholer:
Preventing the Problems Before They Arise, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER
KAYE, SCHOLER, at 235-322 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice, Handbook Series No. 779, 1992).
140. Kaye Scholer’s response is reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR.,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 772-78 (1989).
141. See Curtis, supra note 139, at 989. See also Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the
Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 53 (1993); Simon, supra note 61, at 244.
142. See, e.g., Symposium, From the Trenches and Towers: The Kaye Scholer Affair, 23 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998); Symposium, In the Matter of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and
Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyer’s Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 977 (1993); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The
Meaning of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395 (1993); Peter C. Kostant, When Zeal
Boils Over: Disclosure Obligations and the Duty of Candor of Legal Counsel in Regulatory
Proceedings after the Kaye Scholer Settlement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 487 (1993); Curtis, supra note
139, at 1011-14.
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fragmentary and ambiguous factual record,143 many commentators, in the usual
fashion of ethics discourse, simplify facts by casting the Kaye Scholer lawyers
either as greedy opportunists who turned a blind eye to unmistakable and
blatant client fraud, or as lawyers of integrity who, in the best traditions of the
profession, zealously represented their clients.144
However, the task facing Kaye Scholer in construing the “facts” was a
complicated one. Kaye Scholer lawyers would have been faced with
interpreting multiple and sometimes conflicting sources of information,
including, among other things, construing representations by its clients which,
in turn, involved representations by Keating and by lower echelon
employees,145 examining public and private documents on a complex series of
financial transactions in light of these representations,146 construing the
regulatory and business climate at the time147 and interpreting statements and
reports by the clients’ accountants.148 In light of these varied sources of
information, one commentator concluded that a plausible interpretation of what
was happening at the time is that:
Keating was an aggressive banker who liked to go close to the line of legality
and might from time to time have crossed it. He was not particularly sensitive
to conflicts of interest so far as Lincoln’s money was concerned. But he was
143. Simon, supra note 61, at 283 (characterizing the factual record as “fragmentary and
sometimes obscure”).
144. At least two commentators have noted the cartoonish way that facts are described in
most writings on the affair. See Curtis, supra note 139, at 986 (characterizing the actions of Kaye
Scholer as “fuzzier” than the typical “clear-cut” versions of the story, with “the heroes and
villains . . . in stark relief”); Simon, supra note 61, at 259-67, 277 (detailing how ethics discourse
“evaded” the allegations against Kaye Scholer and characterizing both sides of the debate as
engaging in “conclusory, moralistic denunciations”).
145. For its part, Kaye Scholer, in its unofficial “response” to the OTS charges, asserted that
it justifiably relied on the representations of its clients and accountants as to the legitimacy of its
clients’ business practices. See, e.g., GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 140, at 776-77; Simon, supra
note 61, at 286; Curtis, supra note 139, at 992. In order to support its own claims, OTS charged
that “Kaye Scholer held numerous meetings with Lincoln officials, employees [and] affiliates.”
Daly, supra note 139, at 246.
146. As is often true in allegations of financial fraud, the Kaye Scholer lawyers not only had
to interpret what documents said, but also had to construe the validity of dates and signatures on
documents in light of assurances by client employees that the documents were genuine. Simon,
supra note 61, at 284.
147. This background is itself a complicated issue, especially given that the subsequent
Savings and Loan debacle has tended to color perceptions of what Congress, regulators and
attorneys should have known before the full extent of the debacle became apparent. Id. at 276-80
(exploring the contemporaneous motivations of Congress and bank regulators).
148. Arthur Anderson and Arthur Young issued opinions about some of the transactions in
question. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 140, at 776-77; Curtis, supra note 139, at 992. The
subsequent resignation of Arthur Anderson and Kaye Scholer’s representations about the
resignation in a SEC filing constituted one of the disputed charges against Kaye Scholer. See
Daly, supra note 139, at 252-57; Simon, supra note 61, at 284-86.
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also talented, and running a largely legitimate institution whose problems were
mostly caused by difficult marketplace and regulatory circumstances. Client
officials had justifications and excuses for everything they were doing.
Keating was being targeted aggressively by the Bank Board, not without
reason, but maybe without a balanced understanding of context.149

This is not to suggest that Keating did not commit wholesale fraud150 or
that the Kaye Scholer lawyers acted properly in representing its clients.151
What I am suggesting is that the complexity inherent in divining client motives
and circumstances demonstrates the profound challenges at the core of attorney
fact-finding.
D. The Development of Facts as an Interactive and Discursive Process
Ethical decision-making is an interactive and discursive process that occurs
over time.152 What an attorney can or should do as a matter of ethics is
149. Donald C. Langevoort, What Was Kaye Scholer Thinking?, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 297,
301 (1998). In light of this interpretation, Langevoort notes that Keating’s actions were “fluid
and ambiguous.” Id.
150. Although the Ninth Circuit eventually overturned Keating’s federal and state convictions
on constitutional grounds, he entered into a plea bargain through which he was sentenced to time
served. See supra note 138. This ironic coda to the Lincoln saga means that Keating was never
convicted in a trial that was not tainted by constitutional violations. See Simon, supra note 61, at
244 (stating “The legality of Keating’s conduct was then—and in some respects remains today—
a matter of dispute.”). Nevertheless, at a minimum, it seems likely, as one court found, that
Lincoln’s principals “did engage in numerous unsafe and unsound banking practices.” Lincoln
Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 906 (D.C. 1990) (affirming OTS’s appointment
as Lincoln’s receiver and conservator).
151. Given the complexities of the situation and the spotty factual record, other conclusions
about Kaye Scholer’s conduct are certainly plausible. For example, William Simon has
concluded that if the Kaye Scholer response to the OTS charges is “assumed to be factually
accurate,” there remain “standing at least some of the concerns raised by the [OTS] charges.”
Simon, supra note 61, at 245. Nevertheless, Simon also admits that “[w]e do not know enough to
pass confident judgment on Kaye Scholer’s performance in the Lincoln case.” Id. at 282. In any
event, the Kaye Scholer case continues to raise important normative questions as to the degree to
which attorneys have a duty to investigate and disclose client wrongdoing. For a discussion of
the impact that my general analysis has on the continuing examination of this question, see infra
text accompanying notes 232-36.
152. For a detailed philosophical argument in favor of a dialogic view of ethical decisionmaking that draws upon ideas from Jurgen Habermas’s theory of “communicative ethics,” see
Kupfer, supra note 28. However, Kupfer’s work, like other discussions of the importance of
dialogue to moral reasoning, tends to conceptualize dialogue in the sense of discussing ethical
problems directly with clients and others, not dialogue as a component of fact-finding and fact
investigation. See, e.g., LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 167, 174 (alluding to
“moral dialogue” to change the client’s moral stance, as well as the possibility that it will be “the
lawyer rather than the client who will eventually modify her moral stance”); Ted Schneyer, Moral
Philosophy’s Standard Misconceptions of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529, 1564 (alluding
to the importance of moral dialogue with clients); John Ladd, The Quest for a Code of
Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and Moral Confusion, in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ACTIVITIES
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invariably bound up with a fluid set of meanings (“the facts”) developed
through interactions that attorneys have with clients and others.153
This quality of fact-finding is in contrast to the analytic world typical of
rule interpretation. While legislatures or judges may modify the interpretation
of rules, a rule tends to exist outside of time. This aspect of rule interpretation
has infected conceptions of facts in ethical decision-making. Ethics discourse
typically presents facts in narrative form, and then the clock stops, or rather
disappears, as the proper interpretation and application of a rule is explored.
Discussion and analysis take place in a timeless space where the rule is or
should be and the facts are.154
The example of Ms. Cooper illustrates the interactive and discursive
quality of fact-finding.155 There are multiple possibilities and discursive
strategies that you may consider to explore whether Ms. Cooper is or is not
telling the truth about her substance abuse. Ms. Cooper’s mental impairments
may have produced memory lapses, but how do you bring up such a sensitive
subject? Perhaps you can delicately ask if she has had any problems with her
memory as a result of her mental and physical conditions, or consider whether
she has been inconsistent on other, less critical points, thereby suggesting a
more generalized memory impairment. If you believe that this explanation is
unlikely or uncertain, you could also choose to explore with Ms. Cooper a
range of ways of presenting the issue to the judge under different facts as a
means to help her feel “safe” in being more candid with you, if, in fact, candor
is an issue. You could, for example, suggest that if her substance abuse has
IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING SOCIETIES 154 (Chalk et al., eds., 1980) (“[E]thics itself is
basically an open-ended, reflective and critical intellectual activity” that cannot “be settled by fiat,
by agreement or by authority.”). One social scientist that has explored moral development from a
dialogic/interactional viewpoint is Norma Haan. See, e.g., Norma Haan, Moral Development and
Action from a Social Constructivist Perspective, in 1 HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND
DEVELOPMENT 251 (William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1991); Norma Haan, The
Interactional Morality of Everyday Life, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AS MORAL INQUIRY 218 (Norma
Haan et al. eds., 1983).
153. Although largely unexamined for many years, a growing literature has explored issues
surrounding attorney-client discourse both generally and in specific contexts. See, e.g., William
L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in
Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992); Rubinson, supra note 39, at 15359; Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between the Lawyer
and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019 (1997); Linda
F. Smith, Interviewing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of the “Traditional” Interview and the
“Client-Centered” Interview, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 (1995); Gay Gellhorn et al., Law and
Language: An Interdisciplinary Study of Client Interviews, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 245 (1994).
154. This analytic world embodies the assumption of “constancy of the world” that is a deepseated Western assumption. See supra text accompanying notes 106-08. The excerpt from the
work of David Luban that I critiqued earlier also reflects this atemporal view. See supra text
accompanying note 72.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

ATTORNEY FACT-FINDING

1217

significantly trailed off, the issue can be presented to the Administrative Law
Judge as “under control” or “dramatically reduced.” Or if she has not engaged
in substance abuse for the past week or the past month or the past six months,
the issue can be presented to the Administrative Law Judge as having “ended.”
Of course, it is impossible to play these suggestions out in detail because each
of these discursive choices would be followed by other choices about what to
do in light of the client’s response.
These choices are difficult, challenging and intensely contextual. An
appropriate ethical response warrants understanding the status of the attorneyclient relationship and the possible impact or impacts of such an inquiry on the
relationship. More importantly, the thoughtfulness and sophistication of these
choices profoundly influence the quality of the ethical practice being
conducted. In this sense, attorney-client interactions—and the choices that
influence those interactions—constitute in a fundamental way the essence of
an “ethics problem.”
E.

The Interplay of Facts and Law in Ethical Decision-Making

It is generally a given that facts and law are discrete and severable and that,
therefore, an ethical rule has meaning distinct from facts.156 This assumption
makes the rule-based emphasis of ethics discourse meaningful: one can learn
something about rules qua rules by thinking through how rules apply in
different situations, and this enterprise only makes sense if rules have
meanings independent of the situations that bring them into play.157
Such dualism is subject both to a theoretical critique and an empirical
critique. In terms of theory, neither rules nor facts can be meaningful without
the other. Rules are shells of abstraction without factual content to fill the
abstraction. This is hardly a radical idea; it informs commonplace notions of
how courts can only decide “concrete cases and controversies”158 and the
reliance on the case method in legal education.159 As to facts, the infinite
number of stories and inferences that can be constructed from life’s
circumstances—indeed even the identification of a “situation” as a “situation”

156. See supra text accompanying notes 22-34.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14. One critique of this distinction in ethics
discourse is that merely learning rules is not enough; one must learn to apply them as well. See,
e.g., David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636, 639 (1983).
However, to speak of “rule application” continues to elevate the importance of rules over facts;
rules are applied once the facts are known.
158. This requirement derives from Article III of the Constitution. See generally Lea
Brilmeyer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case” or “Controversy”
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979).
159. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S
TO THE 1980S, 52 (1983) (quoting Christopher Columbus Langdell’s justification of the case
method as mastering principles in “the ever tangled skein of human affairs”).
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that implicates ethics or law—must be shaped by something, and under the
Anglo-American system that something is rules. Put another way, rules give
shape to facts by identifying what is relevant among an array of potentially
relevant circumstances. All of this produces a circularity in which both rules
and facts are interpreted in light of the other.160 Such circularity is not a
critique of conventional legal analysis, but a description of how the process is
fundamentally constituted.161
Apart from theory, empirical studies exploring moral decision-making in
general and ethical decision-making by attorneys in particular suggest that
rigid rule/fact dualism does not reflect how ethical decision-making takes place
in the field. Deborah Rhode has noted that “a half-century of behavioral
research underscores the variability and contextual nature of moral behavior: a
single incident or small number of acts committed in dissimilar social settings
affords no basis for reliable generalization.”162 “Social settings” include such
things as “exposures to temptation, client pressures and collegial attitudes in
his practice setting.”163 Indeed, one researcher recently has found that ethical
decision-making “is a complex phenomenon and varies from situation to
situation,” and that attorneys “base their decisions on different rationales in

160. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
146-52 (1991). This point has also been made in the context of judicial decision-making. See,
e.g., Jan M. Van Dunne, Narrative Coherence and Its Function in Judicial Decision-Making and
Legislation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 465 (1996) (critiquing a “dichotomy” between “norms and
facts” because “[f]acts are formed by norms, that is, selected in anticipation of existing norms,
and, vice versa, norms are formed by the facts presented for a decision”).
161. This process recalls Hans-Georg Gadamer’s influential notion of the “hermeneutic
circle”: “[A] fundamental principle of understanding [is] that the meaning of the part can be
discovered only from the context—i.e., ultimately from the whole . . . . [T]his is a logically
circular argument, insofar as the whole, in terms of which the part is to be understood, is not
given before the part . . . .” HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 190 (1994). This
idea is also implicit in some approaches to meaning prevalent in China in which “the part cannot
be understood except in relation to the whole.” Peng & Nisbett, supra note 107, at 742.
162. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491,
560 (1985) [hereinafter Rhode, Moral Character]. See also Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra
note 10, at 45-48; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 97 (empirical studies of ethical decisionmaking by attorneys suggest that “ethical dilemmas should be seen as situational and
contextual”); LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 117 (“Our moral judgment of a
particular act is highly sensitive to contextual factors—intangibles about particular people or
idiosyncrasies in the facts—that drop out of consideration when we abstract from the act to the
general policies underlying it.”). See also Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Moral
Thought and Action, in HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 45 (William M.
Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1991) (“Situations with moral implications contain many
decisional ingredients that may be given lesser or greater weight depending upon the standards by
which they are cognitively processed and the particular constellations of events in given moral
predicaments.”).
163. Rhode, Moral Character, supra note 162, at 559.
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different settings.”164 In another study in which lawyers were interviewed
about ethics, lawyers “tended to discuss and define ethics from a ‘situational’
standpoint.”165
In sum, what Robert Cover called the “thick contextuality” of “moral
situations”166 suggests that the idea of a rigid boundary between facts and law
misleadingly simplifies the processes of ethical decision-making.
F.

The Situated Attorney as Finder of Fact

Attorneys are situated in a swirl of events as they wrestle with problems of
ethics, and this swirl of events inevitably influences how attorneys construe the
circumstances at issue. As a result, an investigation of the many pushes and
pulls of practice is critical to an understanding of attorney fact-finding.
1.

The Pressures of Practice

An ideal judge is set apart administratively, ethically and even physically
from the matter to be adjudicated.167 This norm of judicial isolation and
“neutrality” is so central to adversarial adjudication that every canon of judicial
ethics is, at bottom, an entailment of this one idea.168
164. Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Study,
48 FLA. L. REV. 197, 247 (1995). Interestingly, Daicoff found that attorneys applied “personal
values” or ethical rules in varying ways depending on the specifics of the situation presented. Id.
at 231. This flexibility contrasts with the more rigid positions characterizing academic debates
about the legitimacy of “personal values” in ethical decision-making. Id. at 231-32.
165. Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday Ethics of
Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 746 (1998). Messikomer notes that while such
lawyers typically noted that they “work within . . . the ethics of a particular situation,” the content
of what they meant was not clear. Id. at 746-47.
An interesting implication of the “situational” nature of ethics problems relates to
cultural conceptions of “ethics” and “morality.” It is generally assumed that a person’s “ethics”
are a matter of choice. After all, a person is not “unethical” by accident. This understanding
appears to reflect a general cognitive tendency “to overestimate the influence of dispositional
factors in explaining another person’s behavior, at the expense of situational influences.”
Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1504. These understandings and tendencies thus appear to
combine to promote the idea that ethics is bound by rules and norms, the violations of which are
attributable to a defect of character. It would be more difficult to condemn decisions as
reflections of immoral dispositions when ethical problems are viewed as more “situational” and
subject to interpretation.
166. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 n.7 (1983).
167. See, e.g., Jack Weinstein, Limits on Judges’ Learning, Speaking, and Acting: Part II
Speaking and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 5 n.16 (1994) (alluding to the ideal of “a
detached magistrate presiding over a dispute in which he or she has neither personal interest nor
predisposition”).
168. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2000) (“A Judge Shall Uphold the
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary); Canon 2 (“A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the
Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s Activities”); Canon 3 (“A Judge Shall Perform
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In contrast, attorneys engaged in ethical decision-making are, by
definition, wholly immersed in the circumstances giving rise to ethical
problems.169 The paradoxical role that attorneys play as participant/decisionmakers in ethical decision-making is crucial to understanding the complexities
of this process. This role means that attorneys have a personal and
professional stake in how problems of ethics are resolved. Given that the
interpretation of facts controls results, attorneys may generate—albeit for the
most part subconsciously—the most attractive result through a plausible
interpretation of facts that leads to that result.170
This is not to say that lawyers are driven solely by broadly defined “selfinterest;” rather, like clients, lawyers are complicated and subject to many,
sometimes contradictory, motivations. There are a number of pressures that
might come into play.
Economic Pressure. Economic pressures may determine how ethical
issues are resolved.171 For example, attorneys who raise ethical issues with

the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently”); Canon 4 (“A Judge Shall So Conduct
the Judge’s Extra-Judicial Activities as to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial
Obligations”); Canon 5 (“A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate
Political Activity”). This is not to say, of course, that judges do not operate under significant
institutional, economic, or psychological pressures of their own. See generally Robert Rubinson,
The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV.
3 (1996). However, at least at the theoretical and formal level, the obsession with judicial
“neutrality” markedly contrasts with the absence of such constraints on ethical decision-making
by attorneys.
169. Judges do sometimes engage in decision-making about themselves when construing the
Code of Judicial Conduct and recusal statutes. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3E (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”); Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest As
Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 665-80 (1985)
(reviewing federal disqualification statutes). In such instances, judges are finders of law and fact
in cases where their own behavior is at issue. See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and
Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 243-44 (1987) (discussing the self-interest of
judges in construing whether they should be disqualified for bias). This type of decision-making
might well involve comparable processes to those I describe for attorneys. However, judicial
decision-making only rarely entails judges construing their own behavior; rather judges virtually
always decide the merits of litigants’ claims in which they are uninvolved.
170. See, e.g., Rhode, Moral Character, supra note 162, at 558-59 (explaining that ethical
decision-making is heavily influenced by “exposures to temptation, client pressures, and collegial
attitudes”); Schneyer, supra note 152, at 1580 (ethical decisions by attorneys are often the result
of financial, psychological or organizational pressures and not because of legal ethics);
Rachlinski, supra note 39, at 752 (“[P]eople construct preferences on the spot to suit mentally
available desires in any given context” and such “preferences fluctuate.”).
171. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 512 (“[T]here will often be substantial economic incentives for
lawyers to choose one interpretation of legal merit over another” in ethical decision-making.).
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clients risk prompting clients to take their business elsewhere,172 and attorneys
who raise ethical issues with senior attorneys risk being fired or hounded out of
the profession.173
Institutional Pressure. It often is in a lawyer’s interest to maintain good
relations with non-clients in order to adequately represent future clients and to
make one’s professional life manageable. For example, one study found that
“defense lawyers are understandably tempted to sacrifice individual clients, or
even their clients as a class, in order to maintain good personal relations with
prosecutors, police, and court and jail personnel.”174
Collegiality. Lawyers often feel compelled to maintain collegial relations
with fellow lawyers.175 This impulse may derive from the impulse to “fit in”
or the need to foster good relations in a small legal community in order to
obtain referrals of future clients.176 For example, an attorney might fear
alienating a fellow lawyer by construing a potential “whistleblower” situation
as triggering a reporting requirement to disciplinary authorities,177 or fear
pressing a client’s substantive or procedural advantages and thereby risk
antagonizing fellow lawyers in a small community or practice area.178

172. An example is the story of OPM Leasing, which engaged in an ongoing series of
fraudulent transactions while being represented by attorneys. OPM “represented more than half
the firm’s annual billings,” and some have argued that the obvious economic interest in retaining
a lucrative attorney-client relationship led the firm to continue its representation despite
suspicions of client wrongdoing. Luban, supra note 91, at 957-58. See also PHILIP B. HEYMANN
& LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 184-97 (1988).
For a more detailed discussion of the OPM matter, see infra text accompanying notes 256-61.
173. This fear proved well founded in one case in which an associate was terminated after
urging his firm to report the misconduct of a fellow associate. Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628
(1992).
174. Schneyer, supra note 152, at 1544-55 (citing Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law
as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 15 (1967)).
175. Rhode, supra note 133, at 681.
176. See DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 140-44 (1990).
177. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3 (1999) holds that a “lawyer having knowledge
that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.” As one commentator has put it,
“[p]robably no other professional requirement is so widely ignored by lawyers subject to it.”
WOLFRAM, supra note 16, at 683. Although a number of reasons help explain this lack of
compliance, a primary reason is likely “fear of retaliation.” Id. at 683 n.17. See also Douglas R.
Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical Analysis of Lawyer SelfRegulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175 (1999); Lisa G. Lerman, Scenes from a Law Firm, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 2153, 2175 (1998). See also Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628 (1992)
(discussing associate attorney’s termination from position in law firm after advocating that firm
report ethical misconduct of another associate).
178. See LANDON, supra note 176, at 140-44.
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The Environment of the Workplace. Attorneys practice in extraordinarily
divergent environments. These environments—ranging from large elite law
firms, in-house legal departments, solo practices, government agencies, public
defender offices and civil legal services offices—inevitably influence ethical
decision-making.179 Moreover, individual firms also have “cultures,” and
these cultures encourage lawyers to approach ethical decision-making in ways
that conform to prevailing firm norms.180
Workload. When disembodied from practice, the work of ethical decisionmaking seems minimal. When placed in the context of overworked attorneys,
however, ethics take time. Some of this is a function of the effort required to
conduct legal research on ethical problems. Perhaps even more importantly,
however, fact-investigation and applying rules to facts is time consuming:
consider the extra work required to determine if a party is represented in a
given matter,181 working through suspicions of perjury with clients or
witnesses182 or filing a complaint against another attorney.183 Such inquiries

179. Douglas N. Frenkel, et al., Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and
Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 698 (1998); Wilkins, supra note 9, at 486-89, 512.
My own practice experience included periods both as an associate with a large law firm and as a
staff attorney with a small civil legal services office. The two experiences were radically
different in every respect: the nature of the clients I served (large corporations versus indigent
elderly people), the volume of cases (five or six cases versus eighty), the resources and support
staff available to assist me in case development (substantial versus few or none) and the nature of
the fora in which I typically practiced (federal court versus “poor people’s courts,” such as New
York City’s Housing Court, which operates with minimal due process and little or no discovery).
The crushing workloads, desperate clients, inadequate resources and understaffing typical of
public defender and civil legal services offices cannot help but influence the manner in which
attorneys grapple with questions of ethics. See, e.g., HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra note 172, at
69-105 (describing work in a public defender’s office). Similarly, the economics of firm practice
carries its own pressures. See generally Lerman, supra note 177. Some commentators have
recognized this diversity and have suggested that ethical rules be more finely tuned to different
practice contexts. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
180. One first-person account by a law firm associate details billing practices ranging from
the suspect to the outright fraudulent, all of which were viewed as norms within a particular
firm’s culture. See Lerman, supra note 177, at 2175. Among the practices described by
Lerman’s anonymous associate were: effective minimums of four-tenths of an hour for telephone
conversations, id. at 2158; changing time billed by paralegals to time billed by attorneys, id. at
2162; billing conversations with colleagues about cases as “legal research,” id. at 2165; billing for
time spent thinking about a case even if not in the office, such as while “mowing the lawn over
the weekend,” id. at 2166. These practices were never explicitly articulated—“partners were very
careful not to instruct us to do dishonest billing”—but were assimilated norms which were
required in order to survive in the culture of the firm. Id. at 2158. But see Messikomer, supra
note 165, at 755-58 (in interviews with criminal defense lawyers, notion of firm “culture” was
“free-floating and amorphous rather than precise”).
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
183. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (1999).
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can also destabilize relationships with clients, attorneys or judges, thereby
increasing the time and effort required to represent a client. While it might
seem that even significant expenditures of time are trivial when one’s
professional license or professional integrity are at stake, licenses and integrity
can be protected more efficiently by simply interpreting situations as not
calling ethical rules into play.184
Personal Commitments to Clients. Lawyers often experience feelings of
loyalty, concern or responsibility towards clients.185 These feelings might
intensify given the profound impact that a lawyer’s professional performance
might have on the lives of clients. In this way, lawyers often confront ethical
dilemmas in an intensely personal way, not in the bloodless, purely analytic
sense of, for example, choosing between “the interests of third parties” and
“interests of clients.”186
Therefore, “real” clients—Ms. Cooper, for example—might trigger the
emotions and passions of lawyers. The decision to disclose client confidences
or to withdraw from representation becomes agonizing. Faced with the
complex, uncertain task of construing whether Ms. Cooper lied, it is
plausible—perhaps likely—that you will find that Ms. Cooper has not—or that
you are not sure if she has.
2.

The Judicial Role Versus the Attorney Role

The differences between the “neutral” stance of a judge and the
participatory stance of the lawyer embody even more subtle yet significant
distinctions between judicial decision-making and ethical decision-making by
attorneys.
Judicial decision-making defines the judicial role; it is, after all, what
makes judges judges. In contrast, attorneys are not only ethical decisionmakers. Rather, the ethical practice of law is part of the texture of practice;
184. See Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 10, at 45 (describing “time pressures” as one
of the substantial factors influencing ethical conduct by lawyers); Langevoort, supra note 149, at
298 (“So who succeeds as a lawyer? Not the moral obsessive, the one who spots ethical issues
everywhere and dwells on them with painstaking deliberation. In high-pressure settings like
corporate law, that is debilitating and distracting from the demanding tasks at hand.”).
185. See, e.g., Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (Of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1990 (1995) (describing the deep connections attorney felt as a mother towards her client in an
adoption case).
186. David Luban alludes to a similar idea when he argues that “emotions are not just a
complement to moral reasoning, they are a component of it.” David Luban, Reason and Passion
in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 899-900 (1999). See also Ellmann, supra note 40, at 2674
(discussing how “people in professional contexts do respond to the calls of affection, loyalty,
sympathy”). Of course, lawyers sometimes make a concerted effort to impose professional limits
on emotional attachments to clients. Id. at 2695-97. In addition, lawyers sometimes might not
experience a personal commitment to clients but, conversely, a personal distaste for clients, which
no doubt has its own influence on findings of fact.
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ethics hums in the background, and ethical decision-making only rises to the
surface when the interaction of interpreted facts and interpreted ethical rules
threaten the norms of practice. The texture of practice therefore constitutes
and is constituted by ethics, and practice is, at bottom, “solving (or making
worse) problems of clients and others, under conditions of extraordinary
complexity and uncertainty, in a virtually infinite range of settings.”187 While
judicial decision-making may involve the resolution of difficult questions of
fact, the carefully protected isolation of the judicial role is utterly different
from the shifting and uncertain factual matrix through which attorneys
navigate.
Furthermore, within the adversary system, the judicial role is passive. A
judge’s primary role is not to go out and find facts, but to interpret evidence
found and presented by advocates or litigants. While judges also actively
interpret facts,188 lawyers—unlike judges—do not have facts presented to
them; a primary challenge of lawyering is to develop facts through formal and
informal investigation and to construct narratives that a decision-maker or
adversaries will find persuasive.189 This open-ended, creative process offers
lawyers opportunities for construing facts in ways that are in line with the
interests of clients. However, “[p]rofessional techniques for proving facts to
others are insufficient for the purpose of deciding facts for ourselves” when
resolving issues of ethics.190
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ETHICS SCHOLARSHIP AND PEDAGOGY
In the first section of this Article, I demonstrated that ethics discourse
submerges the factual dimension of ethical decision-making. In the second
section, I explored not only how fact-finding is at the core of ethical decisionmaking, but also how this largely hidden dimension implicates a rich array of
processes and issues. In this final section, I integrate the elements of my
preceding analysis and offer a preliminary view of what a fact-sensitive ethics
scholarship and pedagogy would look like.

187. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 317 (1995).
188. See Patricia Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric, Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Rubinson, supra note 168, at 4.
189. While especially true of trial lawyers, the construction of narratives is a critical
dimension of appellate advocacy as well. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall’s
Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in Brown, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 226 (1993).
190. Hazard, supra note 21, at 139.
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The Integration of Legal Ethics into the Practice of Law

A central implication of my analysis thus far has been that ethics discourse
should better reflect the central role that fact-finding plays in ethical decisionmaking.
This, however, is at best only a half step. One could go further: the
problem with fact formalism in ethics discourse is that it isolates ethics from
the practice of law. Indeed, Part II of this Article describes not only factfinding in ethical decision-making, but also fact-finding in the practice of law
more generally.
For example, a primary challenge generally facing
practitioners is the fluidity and ambiguity of facts191 which, in turn, often
involves the interpretation of complex and ambiguous motivations and
circumstances.192 In practice, interpreting facts proceeds interactively and
discursively over time.193 Attorneys must interpret facts in light of rules and
rules in light of facts, and thus rules and facts are interrelated.194 Attorneys
interpret facts through a perspective informed by a unique set of psychological,
social and economic influences that shift over time.195 While rule-based legal
research and analysis has its place, it is only one dimension—and not always
the most important one—of the practice of law. By viewing legal ethics as an
isolated body of doctrine, ethics discourse severs ethics from practice and
practice is the only place where legal ethics is meaningful.
Situating ethics discourse squarely in practice has normative implications
as well. The message sent by ethics discourse is that when the time comes for
ethical decisions to be made, facts are already “there.” By focusing instead on
the inherent “thickness” of facts and the challenges of fact interpretation, ethics
scholarship and pedagogy would encourage practitioners and students to view
problems of ethics as embedded in the complex network of understandings that
constitute legal representation. Ethical problems would then be a spur to
revisit these understandings, and practitioners might find themselves not only

191. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614-15 (1984); BINDER, supra note 160, at 19.
192. For examples of the complexities and contingencies of representation, see generally
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights
Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Clark
D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of
Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Spinak, supra note 185.
193. See, e.g., Rubinson, supra note 39, at 153; Naomi Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2475, 2485-93 (1993); Shalleck, supra note 153, at 1032-33.
194. See, e.g., BINDER, supra note 160, at 146-52.
195. See Rubinson, supra note 39, at 153; Shalleck, supra note 153, at 1032-33.
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confronting problems of ethics with greater sensitivity, but also the challenges
of legal representation with greater sensitivity as well.196
The challenge for participants in ethics discourse, therefore, is to integrate
ethics into the world of practice. In the final sections below, I suggest some
parameters and initiatives for such a newly integrated ethics discourse.
B.

Implications for Ethics Scholarship

A fact-centered ethics scholarship would reflect ethical decision-making in
the context of representing clients and engaging in the practice of law. This
new ethics scholarship would also build upon recent work that manifests
dissatisfaction with prevailing ways of “doing ethics.” 197 There are a number
of ways to approach this new emphasis.
1.

Beyond the Hypothetical

Ethics scholarship that focuses on fact-finding should reduce its reliance
on fact hypotheticals. As I have noted, fact hypotheticals virtually always
define away fact-finding as meaningful to ethical decision-making.198 To
imagine an ethics scholarship free of fact hypotheticals is in and of itself a way
to conceptualize a more textured, fact-centered way of approaching the field.
One hypothetical-free technique that has produced important insights—
including insights that I have drawn upon in my preceding analyses199—
involves interviewing attorneys, law students, clients or others about their

196. The emphasis I am suggesting resonates with feminist scholarship that argues for an
increased role of an “ethic of care” in legal ethics. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39
(1985); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4; Ellmann, supra note 40; Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and
Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175
(1992). These perspectives also tend to put the locus of moral decision-making into the attorneyclient relationship in contrast to the prevailing rules-focus of ethics discourse, although they do
not conceptualize this in terms of the importance of facts and fact-finding.
197. See, e.g., Kupfer, supra note 28, at 36, 87 (critiquing “[t]he traditional approach to
professional ethics” which relies on “general principles”; instead, ethical values should be
determined through an “intersubjective” and “rigorous debate” among “all concerned persons”);
Tremblay, supra note 30, at 492 (critiquing deductive models of “applied ethics” and arguing for
the application of “casuistry,” which is “a case-based, particularized, context-driven method of
normative decisionmaking”).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71, 86-90. Even much of the existing empirical
research on law students’ and attorneys’ ethical decision-making and moral reasoning typically
employs instruments that record students’ reactions to factual situations that are determinate. See,
e.g., Daicoff, supra note 164, at 227 (methodology of study included a “questionnaire containing
five professional ethical dilemmas”); Hartwell, supra note 11, at 511-12 (employing a testing
instrument to measure moral development called “the Defining Issues Test” which “compris[es]
six vignettes, each presenting a moral dilemma”).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 179-80.
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experiences with real or simulated ethics problems encountered in practice.200
Perhaps even greater insights can be generated by examining transcripts or
videotapes of students or practitioners who are participating in simulations or,
with appropriate consent and preservation of confidentiality, of students in law
school clinics or practitioners involved in real cases.201 This latter technique
has especially great potential to capture the complexities I have been
examining because it examines the details of interactions as they occur, and it
resists the factual simplifications typical of other types of ethics discourse.
A superb and rare example of this type of scholarship is a study by
William L.F. Felstiner and Austin Sarat of how power and responsibility are
negotiated in interactions between matrimonial attorneys and their clients.202
While the allocation of decision-making power between attorney and client is
ostensibly governed by rules,203 the factual content of the question—defining
what clients want, how attorneys conceive of what clients want, how the needs
of attorneys and clients are negotiated through their interactions—only has
meaning when concretized in the give and take of actual representation.
Felstiner and Sarat did concretize this question by observing and transcribing
actual attorney-client interactions.204
200. See, e.g., Messikomer, supra note 165, at 740-41 (analysis of meetings with lawyers and
judges about “ethics and professional behavior”); Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal
Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 213 (1991) (as part of study, researcher
“encouraged” first-year law students “to define a moral conflict and discuss, in their own terms,
the actions they took and the decisions they made in the moral conflict”). A related technique is
to administer questionnaires to subjects instead of interviewing them directly. See Sandra R.
Farber & Monica Rickenberg, Under-Confident Women and Over-Confident Men: Gender and
Sense of Competence in a Simulated Negotiation, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 271, 289-91 (1999)
(empirical analysis of questionnaires administered to law students before and after simulated
negotiation).
201. Some scholars have adopted this technique in areas other than ethics with students
performing simulations. See, e.g., Gellhorn et al., supra note 153, at 251-55 (analysis of
videotapes and transcripts of interviews of clinic students with actual clients seeking disability
benefits); Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy
and “Feminine” Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635, 1655-58 (1991) (analysis of videotapes and
transcripts of law students conducting a simulated initial client interview).
202. Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 153. For other descriptions of this research, see Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 20 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 93 (1986); Austin Sarat & L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989).
203. Rules that come into play in this area are MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a)
(2001) (a “lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued”), and R. 2.1 (noting that lawyers “[i]n rendering advice may refer not only to law, but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors”).
204. Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 153, at 1450 n.12. In addition, Felstiner and Sarat also
attended judicial proceedings and mediations and interviewed lawyers and clients about their
experiences. Id.
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Felstiner and Sarat’s fascinating conclusions resist easy summary because
their methodology captured enormous complexity in how “power” plays out in
attorney-client interactions. They found that not only did “power and
resistance” on the part of lawyers and clients shift over time, but also that “it
was often difficult to say who, if anyone, was ‘in charge,’ who, if anyone, was
directing the case.”205 Both attorneys and clients sought to shape a case, and
their continuing, divergent strategies to do so constitute what Felstiner and
Sarat called ongoing “negotiations over reality and responsibility.”206
This type of analysis can open up exciting possibilities in many areas of
legal ethics. Consider, for example, issues relating to confidentiality—an area
that is unusual in that ethics scholars and even the United States Supreme
Court acknowledge a pressing need for “empirical” data about the impact (or
lack thereof) of confidentiality on representation.207 A study of attorney-client
interactions could lead to a deeper understanding of how attorneys interact
with clients about confidentiality, how attorneys determine whether the factual
predicate for disclosure of confidences has been met, and the impact of such
interactions and determinations on clients and how this influences what they
say to lawyers and conceive of the quality of the representation that they are
receiving.
2.

“Ordinary” Ethics

A factually-sensitive ethics scholarship should move beyond the
extraordinary circumstances that are often the bread and butter of discussions
of legal ethics. These “hard cases”—witnesses and clients who unambiguously
threaten or commit perjury,208 whether to disclose an opposing party’s
potentially life-threatening medical condition that the opposing party does not
know about,209 a client’s confidential confession to a murder for which an
innocent person is about to be executed210—are superb vehicles for
reconsidering the principles underlying legal ethics. This, however, comes at a
price. While these circumstances are rife with issues of fact, factual issues
inevitably fade in light of the spectacularly difficult challenge of reconciling

205. Id. at 1496.
206. Id.
207. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 n.4 (1998) (in determining that the
attorney-client privilege continues after a client’s death, Court noted that “[e]mpirical evidence on
the [attorney-client] privilege is limited”). William Simon has been a particularly strong critic of
how often defenses of confidentiality are “sloppy, cavalier, and dogmatic” and rely on
“assumptions about behavioral trends” without empirical evidence to back them up. SIMON,
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 56.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
209. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
210. See SIMON, PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 163. For a discussion of the
purported “historical” pedigree of this situation, see supra note 62.
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the principles at stake. Moreover, these circumstances are extraordinarily rare
in practice.211
There are, however, many “ordinary” ethical situations that lawyers
repeatedly encounter in practice that are strikingly underrepresented in ethics
discourse, and often the challenges of these situations center on issues of fact.
For example, as discussed throughout this Article, a common problem is not
the “client perjury issue” in its pure form, but, as with Ms. Cooper, the
numerous instances where “truth” or determining “what happened” is elusive
and embedded in many issues at play in representation.212 In this and in other
circumstances,213 whether the factual predicate of an ethical rule has been met
is much more frequently at issue than the more classic, simplified
circumstances of fact hypotheticals. Moreover, issues related to the allocation
of decision-making power between attorney and client214 and how
confidentiality influences representation215 exist virtually every time attorneys
and clients talk to each other. These questions are no less fascinating,
challenging or important for being “ordinary.”
3.

New Theories and Methodologies

As I have already noted, conventional legal analysis is not well suited to
exploring the factual dimension of ethical decision-making.216 However,
methodologies from the social sciences hold great promise in this area.
Collaborations among ethics scholars and social scientists would resonate with
recent trends towards interdisciplinary scholarship,217 including examples from
211. See Tremblay, supra note 46, at 29 (noting that in “16 years” as a practicing lawyer and
clinician, he never encountered such “dramatic” ethical dilemmas, although his “practice is
always ethically challenging”). As a practitioner and clinician, I also have never confronted these
challenges. As Tremblay notes, however, the point is that the many ethical issues that do arise in
practice (and which often involve issues of fact) are underrepresented in ethics discourse. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 95-96, 137, 155. In addition, the
“truthfulness” issue recurs in less dramatic instances, including negotiations, affidavits and
written submissions to courts and agencies. These “ordinary” circumstances as situated in
practice also warrant greater exploration in ethics discourse.
213. Other examples include whether under Model Rule 8.3 a lawyer has sufficient
“knowledge” of misconduct by another lawyer in order to trigger a reporting requirement,
whether under Model Rule 1.13 a lawyer for an organization “knows” that the organization is
about to commit a “violation of its legal obligation,” and whether under Model Rule 1.7(a) a
lawyer “reasonably believes” that a conflict “will not adversely affect” representation of a client.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 202-06.
215. See supra text accompanying note 207.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 109-118.
217. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 39; George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary
Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge
Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1993). Even a critic of some types of interdisciplinary work
notes that “the most important general development in legal scholarship over the past two decades
has been the remarkable flourishing of interdisciplinary work bringing together law and the
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the literature on professional ethics and studies on the attorney-client
relationship.218
One potentially rich methodology is called “discourse analysis.”219
Discourse analysis explores the microdynamics of conversation, and, in so
doing, focuses on the shifts and meanings that come into play as one or more
individuals interact.220 By capturing the fluidity of discourse, discourse
analysis would reintroduce the interpersonal as an integral aspect of ethical
decision-making.221
The value of discourse analysis is particularly apparent when recalling that
facts are extratextual, embedded in a world in which circumstances and
relationships—and our interpretations of these circumstances and
relationships—shift over time.222 By examining these shifts as lawyers or law
students interact with clients or each other in situations identified by ethical
rules as potentially problematic, scholars could explore these pressures,
understandings, and misunderstandings as they get played out as attorneys
interpret what is happening.
In addition, a rich literature in social psychology223 and cognitive
science224 offers an array of insights into how humans construe the stream of

humanities and social sciences.” Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4
YALE J. L. & HUM. 79 (1992).
218. Indeed, a growing number of legal scholars recognize that the insights and
methodologies of social scientists can vastly enrich the tools legal scholars have to explore
otherwise obscured dimensions of the practice of law. Elizabeth Mertz, for example, has
identified a “push for a new synthesis that brings together legal theory, legal practice, and
empirical research on law” as a way to foster an “adequate understanding of how practicing
attorneys identify, negotiate around, and respond to ethical dilemmas in their everyday
experiences.” Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Ethics in the Next Generation: The Push for a New Legal
Realism, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 237, 241 (1998). See also David Wilkins, Redefining the
“Professional” in Professional Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Teaching
Professionalism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 245 (1995) (description of interdisciplinary
teaching of ethics); John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) (collaboration between professor of law and
professor of cultural anthropology and sociology on how litigants interact with the legal system);
Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 153 (collaboration between sociologist and legal scholar on how
power is negotiated in attorney-client relationships in divorce cases).
219. For a description of discourse analysis, see Gellhorn et al., supra note 153, at 251-55.
220. See, e.g., Rubinson, supra note 39, at 143.
221. Some legal scholarship has recently begun to draw upon this technique. See, e.g.,
Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 153; Smith, supra note 153; Gellhorn et al., supra note 153;
CONLEY & O’BARR, supra note 218. Discourse analysis has been used far more extensively in
investigating doctor-patient relationships. See Gellhorn et al., supra note 153, at 247-48.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 124-55.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 126-34.
224. The impulse behind cognitive science is “to discover and to describe formally the
meanings that human beings creat[e] out of their encounters with the world, and then to propose
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events that eventually congeal into “the facts.” For example, as I have noted,
social psychology describes in detail many cognitive shortcuts employed by
humans when interpreting facts.225 Cognitive science has, among other things,
explored how humans construct meanings through metaphors and
categories.226 While such insights have on occasion appeared in legal
scholarship227 and ethics scholarship,228 there are enormous opportunities for
significant work in these areas.
4.

Coming Full Circle: Reconsidering Rules

Although perhaps counterintuitive, an ethics scholarship that takes facts
seriously would generate fresh insights about rules of ethics.
One foundational issue is the impact of rules themselves. An unspoken
assumption underlying the recent explosion of ethics rules229 and proposals
advocating different rules for different practice contexts230 is that rules are the
primary means through which to promote an ethical practice of law. A more
factually-focused scholarship might explore whether rules meaningfully
influence attorney conduct. Instead, perhaps more training, discussion and
scholarship on the plethora of issues relating to the construction of facts would

hypotheses about what meaning-making processes [are] implicated.” JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF
MEANING 1-11 (1990) (describing the history and development of the “cognitive revolution”).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 126-34.
226. For a comprehensive description of the role that metaphors and categories play in
cognition, see GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987). See also GEORGE LAKOFF AND MARK JOHNSON,
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). For an application of cognitive science to ethics generally, see
JOHNSON, supra note 30.
227. For example, Steven L. Winter has produced an important body of scholarship that
applies cognitive science to jurisprudence. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and
Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990); Steven L. Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for the Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989). For an example of the application
of cognitive science to lawyering theory, see Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering
Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 317 (1995).
For summaries of how legal scholars have applied psychological theories of decision-making, see
Rachlinski, supra note 39 (detailing the rise of “behavioral decision theory” in legal scholarship),
and Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1506 (1998) (collecting legal scholarship that applies
behavioral theories of judgment).
228. Donald C. Langevoort has written most extensively on psychology and legal ethics. See
supra note 126.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 41.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
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do more to sensitize practitioners and law students to the many concerns
underlying ethical rules.231
Moreover, the fact-based issues I have described would significantly
contribute to debates about specific rules. A good example concerns the
degree to which a lawyer has a duty to investigate suspected client fraud and
the related issue of “avoidance of knowledge” that I described earlier.232 Wellpublicized instances of attorneys who ostensibly shut their eyes to what
appears to be obvious fraud, such as the actions of attorneys representing
OPM233 and Lincoln Savings & Loan,234 has led ethics discourse to pay
increasing attention to these issues.235
Our understanding of these sorts of situations would greatly benefit from
sustained examination of the fact-finding issues I have highlighted. While the
caricature of the greedy client subsidizing a greedy lawyer’s studied
indifference to a client’s financial irregularities tends to define debates in this
area, the circumstances facing most attorneys in practice are far more
complex.236 A fact-based ethics discourse would move away from caricature
towards a more nuanced consideration of the multitude of situational and
psychological factors that influence attorney fact-finding. In the end, such
investigations might help us to better understand what obligations (if any)
attorneys might have in the face of factual uncertainty and explore whether
rules can be reformulated to provide more meaningful guidance on the
question.
5.

Jettisoning Fact Formalism in Ethics Theory

Finally, this new ethics scholarship would complement and enrich existing
theories of ethical decision-making.
William Simon and David Luban have respectively argued that ethical
decision-making should include “contextual” issues such as “justice”237 and

231. As noted supra note 45, some scholarship has in fact suggested that the role that rules
play in ethical decision-making is vastly overstated.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 91-99.
233. For a description of the OPM matter, see infra text accompanying notes 256-61.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 138-51.
235. Unsurprisingly, much of the discourse on these issues relates to issues of what rules
apply. This issue is especially complex because the more prominent examples of this question,
such as the Keating matter, take place in the context of banking and securities law which, in turn,
impose duties on attorneys separate and apart from obligations under ethical rules. See generally
George H. Brown, Financial Institution Lawyers as Quasi-Public Enforcers, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 637 (1994). The degree to which there are obligations beyond those in ethical rules is
hotly disputed. Id. at 640-41.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 138-51 (exploring this point in the context of the
Kaye Scholer matter).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
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“personal morality.”238 Other scholars have argued for more finely tuned
ethics rules that better reflect the many contexts of practice.239 By combining a
factually sensitive approach with a richer understanding of legitimate sources
of ethical guidance—in essence, by taking anti-formalism seriously from both
the fact and the law side—scholars could seek to refine theories of ethical
decision-making by more accurately reflecting the richness and complexity of
ethics in practice. This might ultimately produce a more dynamically
conceived ethics that grapples with the challenges of deciding problems of
ethics in situ without static facts or, for that matter, static rules as predicates.
While the preceding analysis can only hint at what such an ethics would look
like as a matter of theory, it is clear that such an ethics would capture much of
what ethics is like in the field.
C. Implications for Ethics Pedagogy
Addressing issues about facts and their role in ethical decision-making can
add richness and depth to the more traditional rules-focus of ethics pedagogy
and ultimately to the way attorneys engage in ethical decision-making in
practice.240 The themes developed in this Article can be explored through a
number of teaching styles and pedagogical techniques.241 My intention is not
to propose one systematic way to investigate these themes with students, but to
offer a menu of options from which to pick and choose. Indeed, instructors
can use many of these techniques in combination. Such flexibility is important
given that available options are often contingent upon resource limitations,
credit hours for the course, and instructor experience and preference.

238. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
240. The importance of facts and fact investigation in training law students has been building
for some time, and has been manifested most prominently in the ABA’s “MacRate Report” in
1992. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUC.
AND PROF’L DEV.—AN EDUC. CONTINUUM, REP’T OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND
THE PROF.: NARROWING THE GAP 38 (1992) (citing and detailing “factual investigation” as a
“fundamental lawyering skill”). This impulse has even led some states to supplement that most
rule-bound of institutions—the bar examination—with a “Multistate Performance Test,” an
avowed purpose of which is to explore an applicant’s ability to “[i]dentify relevant facts” and to
“[p]lan a factual investigation.” NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE MULTISTATE
PERFORMANCE TEST: 1999 INFO. BOOKLET 3 (1998). See also Randall T. Shepard, From
Students to Lawyers: Joint Ventures in Legal Learning for the Academy, Bench and Bar, 31 IND.
L. REV. 445, 453 n.26 (1998) (listing states that have adopted the Multistate Performance Test).
241. Over the past few decades, substantial literature has emerged which reviews and/or
advocates different pedagogical techniques in teaching legal ethics and professional
responsibility. See generally Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An
Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEG. ED. 75 (1991). See also supra text
accompanying notes 9-12.
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Before examining specific techniques, one general observation is important
to bear in mind. A judicial perspective radically thins the nature of ethical
decision-making.242 This is because a judicial perspective typically evaluates
the actions of others given a situation, not in the context of the uncertainty and
change that happens within a situation from a certain perspective. In ethics
pedagogy, therefore, students should be attorneys whenever possible,
preferably attorneys embedded in a stream of events that implicate ethical
decision-making. Such a perspective helps to replicate the pressures and
influences and factual uncertainties faced by attorneys in practice.
Keeping this general principle in mind, what follows is a range of
techniques that can expose students to the factual dimensions of ethical
decision-making. I first discuss the techniques that most effectively explore
fact issues, and then progress (or, rather, regress) to the least effective.
Nevertheless, with a certain amount of tweaking and shifts in emphasis, issues
of fact can be investigated through all of these techniques.
1.

Clinical Teaching

Classroom teaching about ethics is necessarily artificial; it can never
replicate the nuances and tensions of practice. The same is true of simulations.
As the name implies, simulations simulate, but a simulation is not the real
thing. The value of live-client clinical teaching, therefore, is that ethics issues
arise in live-client clinics as they do in practice because clinical teaching is
practice, albeit practice with the added advantage of a clinician who can guide
and encourage students to reflect systematically about the complexities of their
tasks.243
In terms of the themes I have developed thus far, clinical teaching is an
extraordinarily effective means to explore ethics because there is no escaping
the challenges of fact-finding and ethical decision-making when representing
clients. In Austin Sarat’s phrase, “the hypothetical materializes” in clinics,244
and the uncertainties of ethical decision-making are virtually impossible to
miss if the clinician and other students work through the complexities of the
situation together. A clinical experience also helps students come to grips with

242. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
243. For discussions of teaching ethics in the context of clinics, see Luban & Millemann,
supra note 4; Tremblay, supra note 46, at 33-42; Joan L. O’Sullivan et al., Ethical
Decisionmaking and Ethics Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 109 (1996);
Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605
(1996); Solomon, supra note 12; Leleiko, supra note 12.
244. Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal
Education, 41 J. LEGAL ED. 43 (1991). See also Tremblay, supra note 30, at 521 (advocating
“‘thick’ descriptions of context” instead of “hypothetical problems” in the teaching of ethics, and
noting that “the clinic . . . offers the most promising environment for students to experience the
levels of tension and ambiguity necessary to develop practical judgment” on questions of ethics).
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ethics as immanent in practice, that is, an “ethics issue” is virtually never a
free-standing “problem” that can meaningfully stand separate and apart from
other aspects of practice. Indeed, as I have previously noted, ethics issues
resonate throughout an attorney’s relationships with clients, colleagues, judges
or adversaries, and this happens over time as interpretations of circumstances
shift.245 No pedagogical technique can fully duplicate this textured experience
except experiential teaching itself.246
An example of the potential of clinical ethics pedagogy is the case of Mrs.
Cooper.247 A student handling this case would, among other things, need to
recognize that the factual question of Ms. Cooper’s possible substance abuse is
critical not only as an ethics issue, but also as an issue central to her disability
case. Next, as I described earlier,248 the student would need to determine
whether there even is an ethical problem by grappling with the uncertainty
about whether and how much Ms. Cooper has engaged in substance abuse. In
reaching this determination, the student would be faced with a menu of
different strategies as to how to explore this issue. The student would then
need to reevaluate the situation as it unfolds in light of the student’s decisions
about how to proceed.
In contrast, consider the likely form that Ms. Cooper’s case would take as a
fact hypothetical: “You represent a disability claimant who tells you that she
has not abused drugs. You know that this is false. She plans to testify under
oath that she has not abused drugs at the hearing. What ethical obligation do
you have?” This hypothetical completely misses the texture, challenges and
opportunities inherent in an actual circumstance.
Teaching ethics in a clinical setting, therefore, offers an unparalleled
opportunity for students to experience how ethics issues fold into the realm of
facts and into the representation itself. This promotes not only a richer
consideration of the factual issues at play in the ethical problem, but also a
deeper understanding of the client and her circumstances, which is a positive
goal in and of itself. The result is a deeper understanding of ethical decisionmaking and of legal representation as a whole.
Nevertheless, teaching ethics exclusively through live-client clinics does
have potential limitations. Ethics issues in clinical teaching arise organically
out of cases that are being handled in a given period of time. This means that
it is at times difficult for a clinic to offer a comprehensive and systematic
overview of the sorts of problems attorneys may encounter in practice,
245. See supra text accompanying notes 136-55; 167-86.
246. An additional advantage of teaching ethics through clinics is the degree to which it hones
a student’s ability to spot ethics issues. Ethics issues rarely self-identify themselves, and
observing how they arise out of the stuff of representation is a critical way to sensitive students to
ethical issues they will likely encounter in practice.
247. For a description of this problem, see supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 137, 155.
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although there is still great value in modeling approaches to ethical decisionmaking even in limited circumstances. In any event, live-client clinics require
a significant allocation of resources, an allocation that as a practical matter a
given school may not make available to all students. Classroom courses thus
remain a useful and, for some students and institutions, a primary means of
exploring legal ethics and professional responsibility.
2.

Simulations and Role Plays

There are increasing calls for the use of more simulations and role-plays in
ethics pedagogy as well as in other areas of the law school curriculum.249
These methods are particularly well suited to explore the fact-based issues that
arise in ethical decision-making. They serve as something of a corrective for
the temporal distortion I describe above—the tendency of ethics discourse to
collapse time spent on fact-finding and investigation into a brief recitation of
“the facts.”250
Role-plays, however, do not by themselves necessarily promote greater
sophistication about fact-finding. Role-plays that cast students as advocates
before disciplinary committees or as lawyers meeting with other lawyers in a
meeting of a firm’s “ethics committee” likely offer prepackaged facts, and thus
emphasize the simplified view of facts present in ethics discourse generally.251
Instead, simulations must not clarify factual ambiguities, but encourage
students to explore and confront them. The most effective simulations in this
regard are those that force students to face these challenges by casting students
as attorneys dealing directly with clients.252
In addition, role-plays can never replicate the many feelings and pressures
at play when attorneys encounter ethical quandaries.253 The responsibilities
one feels towards flesh and blood clients, how these responsibilities might or
might not accord with ethical rules and norms, and how this interplay
influences the interpretation of facts can only fully be experienced by students
in the context of real cases, not simulations.

249. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 11; Freiman, supra note 11.
250. See supra text accompanying note 72.
251. For example, in a series of attorney/client simulations, Steven Hartwell asked students to
propose ethical rules to govern the situation and, in performing the simulation, the instructors
only intervened on occasion “to clarify factual ambiguities.” Hartwell, supra note 11, at 523.
While this type of simulation no doubt is valuable as a means to focus on doctrine, it does not
explore the factual dimension of ethical decision-making.
252. For examples of such simulations developed by Carrie Menkel-Meadow, see ROY D.
SIMON & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 131, 297-98, 379-80
(2d ed. 1994).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 169-86.
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Case Studies

Clinics and simulations cast students as lawyers, and thus offer the greatest
potential for students to experience the complexity of ethical decision-making.
However, case studies that present narratives about ethics can also be effective.
Among non-role playing techniques, case studies offer the best means for
exploring fact-finding.254 Unlike judicial opinions, a primary purpose of which
is to present facts and law to justify a judicial decision,255 case studies tend to
focus on narratives about facts and can be constructed through primary
materials such as memoranda, transcripts, or videos. Carefully chosen case
studies can thus highlight fact-finding and fact indeterminacy.
An example of a factually rich case study is the story of OPM Leasing
Services, Inc.256 OPM—the acronym stood for “other people’s money” —
purchased computers that it then leased to corporate customers.257 OPM’s
primary counsel, Singer Hutner Levine & Seeman, advised OPM on leasing
transactions and provided opinion letters to lenders regarding the validity of
OPM’s leases.258 Ultimately, sixty percent of Singer Hutner’s billings were
attributable to OPM.259 A principal of OPM eventually disclosed to a Singer
Hutner partner that he had engaged in fraudulent transactions, but he
repeatedly stated that these activities “were all in the past.”260 Subsequent
conversations and an examination of documents revealed more possible
irregularities, and Singer Hutner, along with two ethics experts it hired,
wrestled with the issue of the degree to which it could or should press OPM to
disclose details about its financial practices. Ultimately, Singer Hutner learned
that OPM had engaged in a massive, ongoing fraud and in light of this
information, engaged in a “phased withdrawal” of its representation.261
Even in my radically stripped-down summary, the story of OPM is
saturated with points of entry to discuss attorney fact-finding and ethics: the
dribbling out of evidence of possible fraud, the shifting credibility and
ambiguity of OPM’s assertions that any wrongdoing had ended, the degree to
which lawyers should explore suspected wrongdoing and how to do the
exploring, the economic self-interest of Singer Hutner and whether it led the

254. For texts employing the case study method, see HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra note 172;
James L. Kelley, LAWYERS CROSSING LINES (2001). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 787 (2000).
255. See infra text accompanying notes 264-66.
256. The OPM story is recounted in a number of ethics texts. See, e.g., HEYMANN &
LIEBMAN, supra note 172, at 184-97 (1988); SIMON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 252, at 93-96.
257. HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra note 172, at 185.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 186.
260. Id. at 188.
261. Id. at 193.
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firm to interpret ambiguous facts in a way that gave OPM the benefit of the
doubt. However, the risks of a case study like OPM is the risk that afflicts
ethics discourse generally: a hindsight bias that views the ultimate “facts”—
OPM’s ongoing fraud—as something that should have been obvious to the
lawyers at the time. It is thus important to place students in the stream of
events, not, as a judge, outside the stream of events as an omniscient observer.
Moreover, a written narrative tends to limit discussion to only those details
included in the narrative. Other details crucial to the fact-finding enterprise—
such as exactly what Singer Hutner said to its client and vice versa—fall away.
It would thus be important to explore exactly what Singer Hutner could or
should have said to its client in light of its evolving interpretation of the
circumstances.
4.

The Problem Method

The “problem method” is an influential pedagogical technique in teaching
ethics.262 This method tends to rely on written hypotheticals designed to
demonstrate the application of legal rules. Like most fact hypotheticals, these
problems are often relatively short and use facts as a conduit to talk about
rules. Indeed, the authors of one text adopting the problem method “tried to
keep the problems simple, believing that on a ‘blank canvas’ without too much
detail we allow for the broadest possible analysis.”263
The exclusive use of the problem method risks eliminating factual issues
altogether from ethics pedagogy. Careful use of the technique with an eye to
issues of fact, however, holds promise. For example, problems could place
students in the stream of events described by the problem, and ask the
student/lawyers what they would do as attorneys in light of the problem. This
question opens up issues of fact-investigation and construction and the
challenges of maintaining the attorney-relationship when issues of ethics are in
play. The problem method can also, like the OPM case study, present
situations that are factually textured and ambiguous. Finally, the problem
method can act as a jumping off point for classroom simulations. Through
such a hybrid technique, students or the instructor can play roles derived from
the problem as part of a classroom discussion, thereby flushing out embedded
issues of fact.

262. A widely used casebook that employs this method is THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2000).
263. RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 3
(1995).
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Judicial Opinions

The use of judicial opinions carries special risks in simplifying facts.264
Appellate cases typically present facts as objective and certain.265 Given that it
is extraordinarily unusual for cases to discuss the complexities of fact-finding,
cases tend to be poor vehicles for helping students confront the intricacies of
fact-finding.266
There are, nevertheless, exceptions. Some decisions excerpt depositions or
trial testimony, the careful examination of which can reveal the different
perspectives of attorneys and clients. For example, Togstad v. Vesely, Otto,
Miller & Keefe267—a legal malpractice case—explores the issue of whether an
attorney-client relationship was established after an initial client consultation.
The opinion includes excerpts from the testimony of one of the plaintiffs and
the testimony of one of the defendant-attorneys. The client’s testimony
includes the following exchange:

264. The use of judicial opinions—or the “case method”—is, of course, the paradigmatic
method of law school teaching. This is largely through the continuing influence of Harvard Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell, whose pedagogy viewed the case method as the best way to
learn legal rules. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, 52-53 (1983).
265. For an especially enlightening critique by a judge of “[t]he conventional wisdom that the
‘Facts’ portion of an appellate opinion merely recites neutral, predetermined ‘facts,’” see Patricia
M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1371, 1386-90 (1995), and Rubinson, supra note 168, at 4 (describing how judicial opinions
“present facts as determinate and finite when in fact they are carefully chosen to present a given
story”).
266. See, e.g., Brest & Krieger, supra note 128, at 532 (noting that “[a]ppellate cases, with the
facts neatly bundled in a few paragraphs,” fail to help students reenact lawyers’ roles in the
litigation); Subin, Reflections, supra note 77, at 136 (law students are “largely oblivious to the
fact-finding process (facts are always already found in casebooks)”). Some have gone even
further and argued that the heavy emphasis on judicial decisions in law school “reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of the legal system, because the overwhelming preponderance of
legally significant decisions are made by lawyers, not judges, legislators, or theorists; and the
overwhelming preponderance of lawyer decisions will never be reviewed or even perceived by
any other official.” Luban & Millemann, supra note 4, at 38. See also Sanford Levinson, What
Do Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do With Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and
Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (1985) (noting that the “emphasis on the judiciary is the
bane of Anglo-American jurisprudence” and criticizing “a jurisprudence” of “law without
lawyers”); Subin, Further Reflections, supra note 77, at 700 (arguing that “the criminal process is
largely administrative in nature, with heavy reliance on the ‘unsupervised, procedurally
unchecked and partly intuitive decisions of the defense attorney’”); Hazard, supra note 21, at 133
(ethical decision-making typically occurs in “the silent world of personal consciousness”);
Wilkins, supra note 9, at 513 (most of attorneys’ “judgments will be made in the lawyer’s office
and will remain unknown to officials, adversaries, and even to clients”).
267. 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980). Portions of this decision are reprinted in several leading
ethics casebooks. See, e.g., GILLERS, supra note 91, at 692; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL.,
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 457 (3d ed. 1999).
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Q:

And it was clear to you, was it not, that what was taking place
was a preliminary discussion between a prospective client and
lawyer as to whether or not they wanted to enter into an
attorney-client relationship?
[Plaintiff]: I am not sure how to answer that. It was for legal advice as to
what to do.268
In contrast, the attorney’s testimony avoided construing the conversation as
involving “legal advice,” instead noting that “[t]he only thing I told [the
plaintiff] . . . was that there was nothing related in her factual circumstances
that told me that she had a case that our firm would be interested in
undertaking.”269
The Togstad case certainly demonstrates the important principle that it is
the client’s perspective that determines whether or not an attorney/client
relationship has been established.270 This is no trivial point given that most
ethical obligations are contingent upon whether an attorney-client relationship
exists.271 However, while Togstad does not involve attorney fact-finding per
se, it does focus exclusively on the point in time when attorneys talk to
clients—the time that drops out all too frequently in ethics discourse.272
Moreover, the Roshomon-like narratives about what happened during a single
attorney-client interaction help to explode the familiar omniscient perspective
of ethical problems. Thus, cases such as Togstad can act as springboards for
discussions about inference and perspective—critical ideas when thinking
about how attorneys construe facts.
Another case to use as a point of entry for exploring fact-finding is Nix v.
Whiteside273—perhaps the most famous judicial decision in legal ethics. Nix is
undeniably important in understanding issues surrounding an attorney’s duty in
a criminal trial when a client intends to commit perjury.274 The Court’s
recitation of the facts, however, offers possibilities for putting students into the
shoes of attorneys who must construe facts:
Until shortly before trial, Whiteside [the criminal defendant] consistently

268. Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 690.
269. Id. at 691 (testifying further that plaintiff “was seeking my opinion as an attorney in the
sense of whether or not there was a case that the firm would be interested in undertaking”).
270. See id. at 693.
271. A primary exception is an attorney’s duty to maintain client confidences, which begins
prior to the formal commencement of an attorney/client relationship and extends beyond the
termination of the relationship. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 16, at § 6.7.2.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
273. 475 U.S. 157 (1986). Nix is reprinted in virtually all casebooks on professional
responsibility.
274. Nix held that an attorney who threatens to withdraw and reveal a client’s proposed
perjury in a criminal case does not deny the client effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 161-68.
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stated to Robinson [Whiteside’s attorney] that he had not actually seen a gun,
but that he was convinced that [the victim] had a gun in his hand. About a
week before trial, during preparation for direct examination, Whiteside for the
first time told Robinson and his associate Donna Paulsen that he had seen
something ‘metallic’ in Love’s hand. When asked about this, Whiteside
responded: “[I]n Howard Cook’s case there was a gun. If I don’t say I saw a
gun, I’m dead.”275

The Nix opinion assumes this conversation presented Robinson with a
clear instance of a client intending to commit perjury.276 Prior to exploring the
doctrinal significance of Nix, however, this brief window into the attorneyclient relationship offers opportunities to investigate questions of uncertainty
and fact investigation. What would students say to Whiteside in response to
Whiteside’s statement? Does Whiteside’s statement now mean that the lawyer
“knows” that his client is about to commit perjury? If not, what sorts of
questions or statements should the lawyer use to explore the meaning of this
statement? Instructors can explore such questions through class discussion, or,
perhaps even more fruitfully, by breaking into a mini-simulation with students
and/or the instructor playing Whiteside and Whiteside’s attorney.
Moreover, Nix contains a rare bonus: an instance of a judge alluding to the
profound disjunction between a judge’s and an attorney’s perspective as to
facts and the ambiguity and uncertainty of fact-finding. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens states:
From the perspective of an appellate judge, after a case has been tried and the
evidence has been sifted by another judge, a particular fact may be as clear and
certain as a piece of crystal or a small diamond. A trial lawyer, however, must
often deal with mixtures of sand and clay. Even a pebble that seems clear
enough at first glance may take on a different hue in a handful of gravel. As
we view this case, it appears perfectly clear that respondent intended to
commit perjury, that his lawyer knew it, and that the lawyer had a duty . . . to
take extreme measures to prevent the perjury from occurring. Nevertheless,
beneath the surface of this case there are areas of uncertainty that cannot be
resolved today. A lawyer’s certainty that a change in his client’s recollection
is a harbinger of intended perjury . . . should be tempered by the realization
that, after reflection, the most honest witness may recall (or sincerely believes
that he recalls) details that he previously overlooked.277

275. Id. at 160-61.
276. The Court adopts the Court of Appeals’ assumption that “for the purpose of the
decision . . . Whiteside would have given false testimony had counsel not intervened.” Id. at 171.
Interestingly, while the certainty of Whiteside’s perjury is a given in the opinion and the Court
avoids addressing the level of certainty that attorneys must have that the client intends to commit
perjury, the Nix oral argument included a lively colloquy among the justices and attorneys about
these issues. See Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some
Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939, 1939-46 (1988).
277. See Nix, 259 U.S. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Given the weight and legitimacy often accorded to statements by judges and
especially by the Supreme Court, this passage offers an opportunity for
students to reflect on the role facts play in the context of Nix and in ethical
decision-making as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Ethics discourse should embrace the complexities of fact-finding as a
critical dimension of ethical decision-making. To be meaningful, this goal
requires shifting away from settled ways of “doing law” embodied in a rulesbased methodology. Such a methodology views issues of fact as a means to
the analytic end of interpreting rules, assumes that ethical decision-making is a
static process of rule interpretation, and adopts a judicial perspective that is
separate and apart from the events at issue. In contrast, a fact-based
methodology views fluidity and change as hallmarks of ethical decisionmaking, recognizes that fact-finding often controls results when attorneys
confront problems of ethics and that fact-finding is a complex act of
interpretation entailing the consideration of many sources of information, and
conceptualizes ethical decision-making as embedded in the maelstrom of
events that constitutes legal representation.
By confronting these aspects of facts in ethical decision-making, ethics
discourse would reflect the myriad challenges facing lawyers who must resolve
problems of ethics in the field. Moreover, by emphasizing a renewed focus on
the “thickness” of facts when confronting ethical problems, a fact-sensitive
ethics discourse would promote the importance of understanding the
circumstances of clients and cases. Such a newly refined ethics discourse
would advance a critical goal—the promotion of a more comprehensive and
textured approach to ethical decision-making and the practice of law as a
whole.

